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ABSTRACT
This study examines eighteenth-century British warfare and the commonly held 
perceptions of its inapplicability to the North American wilderness. Ever since 
independence over two hundred years ago, many Americans have held the opinion that the 
fledgling United Colonies won their independence through the superior military skills of 
the Continentals and the inability of the British Redcoats and their officers to adapt to a 
new form of warfare in America. Their low opinion of the British developed during the 
Seven Years’ War, particularly when General Edward Braddock and his army suffered a 
crushing defeat at the hands of several hundred Indian warriors in the forests of western 
Pennsylvania.
Contrary to these allegations, England’s army was well versed in irregular warfare. 
An examination of the centuries of direct experience in partisan warfare in Ireland, 
Scotland, the European continent, and vicariously through England’s colonists in North 
America, reveals a long-standing involvement with la petite guerre and a thorough 
understanding by British officers o f its nature and dangers. Though oftentimes disdainful 
of this “ungentlemanly” way of war, British officers like Braddock did not ignore 
alternative warfare nor did they disregard the warnings of their colonial brethren. In fact, 
Braddock conducted his campaign in accordance with doctrine developed from centuries 
of British experience (frequently as the victim). Elis defeat was the result of simple error, 
not the result of any inherent flaw in British military doctrine.
Regardless of the reasons behind Braddock’s defeat, the battle unsettled both the 
colonies and the British military establishment. Responding to necessity, the British army 
adapted its well-founded tactics to the American wilderness and emerged victorious in 
1759. However, the colonists were shocked by the overwhelming defeat of the heretofore 
“invincible” Redcoats. Losing confidence in their European overlords, many colonists 
began to believe that they would be better off without the bumbling British, and from 
Braddock’s rout in 1755 emerged early rumblings for independence.
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WARFARE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: 
PRELUDE AND PROMISE
INTRODUCTION
The weather was warm and pleasant on the morning of May 10, 1755. On a 
wilderness road in the backcountry of Maryland, a detachment of sailors from His Britannic 
Majesty’s navy, under the command of Lieutenant Charles Spendlow, R.N., marched along 
the bank of the Potomac River toward Fort Cumberland, the rendezvous point for the 
expedition against Fort Duquesne. Undoubtedly some of the sailors wistfully gazed at the 
water and wondered why they were so far from the familiar landscape o f a man-of-war 
patrolling the ocean. Instead of manning a ship, the sailors were manhandling 3,200-pound 
cannon through the North American wilderness.1
Around noon, the clattering of hooves startled the sailors, who turned and saw a 
spectacle more fitting for the tidewater of Virginia than the frontier. A company of 
Virginia Light Horsemen, festooned in deep-blue uniforms faced with red, galloped down 
the road in two columns. In their midst rolled a light carriage carrying a thick-set British 
officer, resplendent in his scarlet uniform, white, lace cuffs, and tall, black boots. A shiny 
gorget hung below an unremarkable face. A powdered wig, tied at the nape of his neck by 
a brown ribbon, crowned his head, and a black tricorne hat perched on top. Nearby, the 
redcoated drummers of the Forty-eighth Regiment of Foot rattled out the Grenadier’s 
March in salute as the carriage whisked by. A short while later, the slow booming of
1 Winthrop Sargent, ed., “The Morris Journal,” The History of an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, in 
1755; Under Major-General Edward Braddock, Pennsylvania Historical Society, Memoirs, 5 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1856), 373.
2
3seventeen cannon broke the air, announcing the arrival of Major General Edward Braddock 
at Fort Cumberland.2
Braddock’s entry into Fort Cumberland signaled the beginning of Britain’s 1755 
campaign to regain sovereignty over the Ohio Valley, destroy the French fort at the 
confluence of the Monongahela and Allegheny Rivers, and avenge the pride lost at Fort 
Necessity the previous year. The sad conclusion of Braddock’s segment of this campaign 
resulted in one of the most famous battles in American history and one of the most 
infamous defeats in the annals of the British army. As the first large-scale battle in North 
America pitting British regulars against irregular forces, the Battle of the Monongahela 
seemingly demonstrated the inflexible nature of conventional European tactics and the 
unsuitability of British regulars to the wilds of North America. To many colonials, 
Braddock’s insistence on formality, pomp and ceremony, and textbook maneuvers, coupled 
with disdain for all things colonial, including wilderness warfare, caused his calamitous 
defeat.
For over two hundred years, American nationalism has fostered this belief, latching 
on to “obvious” British error as further proof of America’s righteousness and justification 
for the rebellion. But closer examination of previous British military experiences and 
Braddock’s campaign reveal that the British military was well-versed in the ways of 
“alternative” warfare. Braddock conducted his campaign in accordance with solid 
doctrine, developed and tested during two centuries of conflict against French partisans 
and the Celtic warriors o f Ireland and Scotland. Though circumstances and conditions in
----------------------------------------------  j
2 Ibid., 194-95, 373; Charles Hamilton, ed., “Journal of a British Officer,” Braddock’s Defeat (Norman, 
OK: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 42, hereafter cited as “JBO;” Franklin Thayer Nichols, “The 
Organization of Braddock’s Army,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 4 (1947): 124-47.
4America, such as the harsh terrain and the “new” Indian foe, would force a degree of 
adaptation and adjustment, British tactics were suited to the guerrilla warfare found in the 
American wilderness. Simple mistakes and the skill of Braddock’s Franco-Indian foes led 
to defeat, not any flaws inherent in the British military. Despite this reality, public 
perception of Braddock’s defeat had far-reaching consequences. Beyond the flurry of 
accusations bandied about by politicians and army officers and the explosion of violence 
along the American frontier, American colonists began to doubt the invincibility of their 
imperial parent. With their potentate’s vaunted regulars unable to defend themselves from 
“savages” and “papists,” many provincials ventured to believe that the colonies might be 
better off without imperial shackles. From this defeat in the summer of 1755 would 
emerge rumblings of independence and a developing sense of being Americans instead of 
Englishmen.
ITHE IRREGULAR EDUCATION OF JOHN BULL: THE BRITISH ARMY 
AND LA PETITE GUERRE, 1558-1755
On the morning of May 11, 1745, a French army under Maurice, comte de Saxe, 
awaited the approaching allied army in southern Flanders. Saxe’s 53,000 men stretched in 
a two-mile-long line between the villages of Anthoin and Fontenoy. Down a gradual slope 
and across a half-mile o f open ground stood the scarlet and blue battle line of the allied 
army under William Augustus, duke of Cumberland, son of George II of England. As the 
French artillery fired round after round into the allied line, the British, Dutch, and Austrian 
soldiers stood immobile, shifting left and right only to fill the gaps left by careening cannon 
balls. On order, 15,000 men stepped forward in unison and maintained a slow, measured 
step to the beat of the drums. Stiff and silent, the allied soldiers continued to march in 
perfect order, halting only when within pistol shot of the French. The French battle line 
erupted in a single volley and disappeared in the smoke, yet’ few allied soldiers fell. On the 
command of officers and sergeants, the British soldiers leveled their muskets in one fluid 
motion and began pouring volley after volley into the packed French ranks, which writhed 
and finally broke. The allied soldiers pursued the French and repulsed three desperate 
charges by the French cavalry. Only after significant losses and the threat of envelopment 
did Cumberland’s troops retreat. In the same precise manner, the allied soldiers retraced
5
6their steps down the slope, leaving the field strewn with thousands of their dead and dying 
comrades.3
Conventional battles with long lines of soldiers trading volleys at close range, such 
as the battle of Fontenoy, dominated European warfare in the eighteenth century (fig. 1). 
The goal o f conventional armies was to secure geographic locations, such as cities, 
fortresses, crossroads, or mountain passes to gain advantage over their opponents, not 
necessarily to destroy the enemy army. Armed with highly inaccurate muskets, soldiers 
had relatively little chance of hitting an enemy soldier, and thus massed formations and 
firepower were necessary to guarantee any damage to the enemy. Such large formations 
were unwieldy, requiring both constant drilling of soldiers and a great deal of open space to 
conduct maneuvers. Therefore, most battles occurred on large tracts of open land where 
troop formations and wheeled artillery could move with relative ease.4
While such tactics would continue to dominate the battlefield until the twentieth 
century, a different form of warfare, known as la petite guerre or irregular warfare, grew in 
importance in the eighteenth century.5 As in the meaning of “irregular” (not according to 
rule), irregulars avoided the large formations and open battles o f traditional armies. Rather 
than long lines of troops in open fields, slow evolutions, and massed fires, irregular soldiers 
formed small, independent groups capable of speed and mobility. They used raids and 
ambushes to achieve their goals, “to damage the enemy force at the least possible cost to
3 J. W. Fortescue, The History of the British Army, 2nd ed., 12 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1910), 1:110-21; 
James Wolfe to Edward Wolfe, Ghent, May 4 1745, (O.S.), Beckles Willson, The Life and Letters o f James 
Wolfe (William Heinemann, 1909), 49-51.
4 Peter E. Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and 
America, 1740 to 1760,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 35 (1978): 629.
5 Although “guerrilla” and “irregular” were not associated with warfare until the 19th century, for the 
purpose of this paper, these words and “partisan” are used interchangeably.
7themselves” or to deny the enemy needed supplies. Because their foes often outnumbered 
them, irregulars chose their battles, striking when advantageous and fleeing when not.6
American Indians used irregular tactics of their own similar to this European model. 
Ambush was their preferred method of fighting and was a direct extension o f their hunting 
practices. However, before and for a short period after European colonization, Indians 
periodically engaged in open field battles (fig. 2). Captain John Underhill o f Massachusetts 
Bay recorded his impressions of this formal Indian warfare, similar to European set-piece 
battles, and relegated the Indian version to mere recreation. “They come not near one 
another, but shot remote, and not point-blank, as we often do with our bullets, but at 
rovers, and then they gaze up in the sky to see where the arrow falls, and not until it is 
fallen do they shoot again. This fight is more for pastime, than to conquer and subdue 
enemies.” The leisurely path of the arrows, fired in a high arch, allowed the Indians to 
dodge most of the arrows, resulting in relatively few casualties. Underhill scoffed at such 
battles, claiming “they might fight seven years and not kill seven men.” The introduction of 
deadly European firearms to North America eliminated this almost ceremonial form of 
battle. The Indians were quick to realize the deadly potential of firearms, especially when 
aimed at individual targets instead of pointed in the general direction of the enemy as in the 
European fashion. Other characteristics of firearms made them far superior to the bow and 
arrow. “Bullets flew much faster than arrows and took a more direct route to the target. 
The heavy lead projectiles were less susceptible to deflection . . . almost impossible to 
dodge, and more damaging on impact.” Unlike Europeans, who to the Indians seemed to
6 Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness,” 629-30.
8revel in slaughter or were too stupid to realize the destructive power of their weapons, 
Indians abandoned open-field battles and reverted almost exclusively to irregular tactics7
When British regulars arrived in the colonies in great numbers during the 1750s, 
they encountered a new enemy, who by then was highly skilled in irregular warfare and the 
use of firearms. After General Edward Braddock suffered his catastrophic defeat in 1755 
at the hands of a largely Indian force using irregular tactics, the British military was 
universally perceived as a pack of empty-headed fools, ignorant of irregular warfare and 
tactics. Such generalizations were false. Although Braddock was defeated by a band of 
“partisans,” ignorance of guerrilla warfare was not the cause. From the Irish wars of the 
sixteenth century to Charles Stuart’s failed bid for the English throne in 1745, the British 
army constantly experienced irregular warfare. Whether as victims or employers of guerilla 
warfare in Ireland, the American colonies, Scotland, or the European wars of the 1740s, or 
reading of it in popular and professional publications, the British army was thoroughly 
familiar with irregular warfare long before Braddock arrived in Virginia in 1755. Although 
the conditions and foes differed in America, the practical experiences in battle and the 
printed theories of scholars provided British officers and soldiers a solid foundation of 
knowledge applicable to war in the North American wilderness.
England began its long association with irregular warfare in 1170. After receiving 
Ireland from Pope Adrian II in the Bull ’Laudabiliter,' Henry II invaded the island to bring 
his “gift” under control. Six Henrys and three hundred fifty years later, Henry VIII
7 John Underhill, “Newes from America,” Massachusetts Historical Collections, vol. 6, 3rd ser. (Boston: 
1837), 26; James Axtell, “The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness,” in The European and the Indian: 
Essays in the Ethnohistory o f Colonial North America (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981), 138-39; Patrick 
M. Malone, The Skulking Way o f War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1991), 27-52.
9redoubled English efforts to control the wayward island, both to expand his empire and to 
spread the Protestant reformation. Although both he and Henry II had sent Anglo 
administrators backed by military might to govern Ireland, neither king truly extended his 
power beyond the Pale, a relatively small area around Dublin that was truly anglicized.8
Henry VIII took an active interest in Ireland after 1519 and sought to “devise howe 
Ireland may be reduced and restored to good order and obedience.” Henry’s policies 
included reviving the loyalties of the great Anglo-Irish lords (through a system of surrender 
and re-granting of lands), recalling outlying areas to obedience, establishing an island-wide 
tax collection system, extending his religious reforms, and introducing more English-born 
nobles to the government and administration rather than relying on Anglo-Irish lords.
Henry extended his Act of Supremacy to Ireland, but it had little effect except to link the 
advance of Protestantism with the growth of English plantations and the ongoing conquest. 
It was a “fatal alignment of religion and political attitudes.” Henry was too busy with 
continental disputes and intrigues to harshly administer his policies, and he had little money 
and time to spend on a war of conquest.9
Henry’s daughter Elizabeth used different methods to suborn Ireland. Previous 
Anglo administrators and nobles often adopted Irish customs and were gradually 
“hibernicized,” and became “degenerate English.” To truly anglicize the island, Elizabeth 
sought to overwhelm Irish customs by encouraging English families to settle in Ireland and 
provide the Irish with a “civilized” example to emulate. Furthermore, rather than tolerate 
their “wild Shamrock manners,” Elizabeth sought to stamp out the traits of the culturally
8 Grenfell Morton, Elizabethan Ireland (London: Longman, 1971), 3-19; James Axtell, “Beyond the Pale: 
England’s Apprenticeship in Ireland” (lecture presented at the College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Va., 23 February 1999).
10
“inferior” Irish. Elizabeth and her counselors felt the conquest and subjugation of the Irish 
justified. “The government o f these princes was neither politique nor civil, but meer 
tyranical,” wrote an English government official, “for the princes or Lord use at their 
pleasure their tenants, spend upon them with their trains, rule after their own lust, 
commanding all, and not to be gainsaid by any.” More than the supposed tyranny of Irish 
lords, the English despised Irish culture, and in order to “transform Ireland from a menage 
of petty independent lordships into an exploitable appendage,” they would have to destroy 
the Irish cattle-based economy and replace it with Anglo agricultural methods. However, 
the poor Irish soil encouraged transhumance, or “booleying,” frequent movements of 
herds, herdsmen, and escorts (collectively known as creaghts). Based on this, the English 
declared the Irish to be nomads (“[They] run roving about the country like wild men.”) and 
thus fit only for subjugation and reduction to civility. Faced with the institutional 
destruction of their culture, the Irish resisted, and a war of incredible ferocity and 
destruction ensued that raged on and off for the rest of Elizabeth’s reign.10
While the Irish passionately resisted, the English had overwhelming military 
superiority, both in equipment and training. Lacking a formal army other than the personal 
warbands of each chieftain, the Irish resorted to the method suited to their culture: guerrilla 
warfare. Because the Irish were mobile by nature and inclined toward hit-and-run tactics 
used in cattle raids and inter-clan feuds, guerrilla warfare was a natural extension of their 
daily existence.11
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.; Morton, Elizabethan Ireland, 3-11; James Michael Hill, Celtic Warfare, 1595-1763 (Edinburgh: 
John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1986), 17-18; Steven G. Ellis, Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community and the 
Conflict o f Cultures, 1470-1603 (London: Longman, 1985), 40-44.
11 Axtell, “Beyond the Pale.”
11
Besides inherent ability, English superiority in weaponry forced the Irish to adopt 
irregular warfare. Gaelic weaponry and tactics had not kept pace with changes in 
European weaponry that occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Lacking siege 
equipment, stirrups for horses (a centuries-old improvement), and modem firearms, the 
Irish could not compete in a formal, open-field battle. On smaller horses and without 
stirrups, the Irish cavalrymen were not fitted for shock action and were thrust off their 
saddles if they attempted to joust with their English opponents. Sir John Norris held the 
Irish cavalry in such contempt that he declared them fit only to catch cows. The typical 
Irish foot soldier, a kernagh, or kerne, was also lightly armed and possessed no armor save 
for his “glibb,” a thick lock of hair combed over his forehead that might blunt the force of a 
blow (fig. 3). His was “no different in his apparel when fighting or herding cattle.” A 
contemporary English foe described a typical kerne as “ a foot man, slightly armed with a 
skayne [a type of dagger], a target of wood, a bow and shefe or else 3 darts which they 
cast with wonderful facility and nearness, a weapon more noisome . . . than it is deadly.” 
Their bows were half the length of the English longbow and hence had roughly half the 
penetrating power. Lightly armed and armored and possessing inferior weapons, the keme 
were vulnerable in pitched battles against English armies, whose soldiers carried 
arquebuses or heavy fifteen-foot pikes and wore burgonets, corselets, pouldrons, 
vambraces, tasses, and gauntlets.12
Despite such disadvantages, the Irish were wonderfully suited to guerrilla warfare. 
Lacking the heavy armor that weighed down English soldiers, Irish keme moved swiftly
12 Ellis, Tudor Ireland, 118; Hill, Celtic Warfare, 24; Cyril Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish Wars (London:
Methuen and Co, Ltd., 1950), 40, 69-70; Axtell, “Beyond the Pale;” C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth 'sArmy,
12
and skillfully through rough and marshy terrain. Where Englishmen feared drowning, “the 
Irish keme hopped like a goat from one tussock to another.” With such mobility, the Irish 
often chose their battlefield and fought on their own terms, attacking the English “in 
passes, bogs, woods, forests, and in all places of advantage.” According to a captain 
writing to Robert Cecil, Elizabeth’s secretary of state, if a battle turned against the Irish, 
“they held it no dishonor to mn away; for the best sconce and castle for security is their 
feet.” The overburdened English soldiers, suited to open plains and valleys, could not keep 
up with the Irish, who sheltered in the “heavily wooded, marshy or mountainous country 
which typified Gaelic Ireland.” Large English armies that managed to penetrate such rough 
terrain seldom found anyone to fight, and smaller detachments suffered continuous 
ambushes and frequent defeat.13
Using irregular tactics, the Irish enjoyed some successes against English armies. In 
1595, Hugh O’Neill and his Irish army, mostly irregulars, nearly destroyed Sir Henry 
Bagenal’s English army at Clontibret. Using marksmen hidden in “woods and thickets, 
deep and dangerous bogs, steep and craggy hills and mountains,” O’Neill lured the English 
into a trap, sniping at the English soldiers but never allowing a frill battle to develop. As 
their wounded increased, the English column slowed and finally ground to a halt at 
nightfall. Short of powder and ball, the English army survived only because of O’Neill’s 
aversion to night attacks. An English relief column escorted Bagenal’s shaken army to 
shelter the next morning, carrying at least 31 dead and 109 wounded. Other Irish 
successes mirrored O’Neill’s victory at Clontibret, and in fact, with the exception of
2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 117-18. Steel armor for the head, torso, shoulders, arms, thighs, 
and hands respectively.
13 Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish Wars, 46; Hill, Celtic Warfare, 24, 39; Ellis, Tudor Ireland, 118.
13
Yellow Ford in 1598 where the unlucky Bagenal met his death, not one Irish victory “was 
gained in any other circumstances.”14
Such tactics infuriated English officers, leading Thomas Burgh, briefly viceroy of 
Ireland, to complain of “barbaric” tactics employed by the rebel leader O’Neill. “For, as he 
is the dishonestest rebel of the world, so is he the most cowardly, he never making good 
any fight, but bogring with his shot and flying from bush to bush.” At night “he lodgeth 
dispersed in the thicks and holds no firm guards, but throws himself and all his into sundry 
groves, lurking scattered like wolves or foxes, fitter to hunt with dogs than to find with 
men.”15
Seemingly hapless in the rough terrain preferred by the Irish irregulars, the English 
armies had great difficulty bringing their foes to battle. However, English officers were not 
bungling fools, and despite their distaste for Irish ways, several officers sought to adapt 
English methods and adopt Irish means in order to defeat their wily enemy. Recognizing 
the advantage of light, mobile troops, English commanders adapted their weapons and 
armor to the terrain. Some discarded the heavy and ponderous arquebuses for pistols; 
shorter spears replaced fifteen-foot pikes, difficult to wield in forests; and heavy armor 
gave way to leather, mail, or simply no armor at all to allow soldiers to cross marshy 
ground (fig. 4).
Despite these changes, the English army continued to suffer serious setbacks. In 
1599, the queen’s favorite, Robert Devereaux, second earl of Essex, was appointed Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland and given 16,000 infantrymen and 1,300 cavalrymen to subdue 
O’Neill. Four months after his arrival and after suffering defeats at Maryborough and
14 Hill, Celtic Warfare, 25; Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish Wars, 188.
14
Glenmalure, Essex’s force was reduced to only 4,000 effectives. He was soon replaced by 
Charles Blount, eighth Lord Mountjoy. Mountjoy took several steps to reorganize the 
English army in Ireland after becoming viceroy of Ireland in 1600. Instead of relying on 
heavy English horses, Mountjoy switched to hobelars—small, light horses similar to those 
used in the marches of Scotland—which could traverse rough terrain or bogs with relative 
ease. Mountjoy also systematically recruited and employed contingents of Gaelic troops 
from Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. These men, used to the Gaelic ways of war, could 
follow, find, and fight the Irish rebels on their terms. Such border troops became so 
indispensable that one of Mountjoy’s subordinates claimed that “without them no notable 
exploits can be done.”16
Mountjoy also made strategic changes. Instead of penetrating enemy territory and 
leaving an isolated garrison to “pacify” the region, Mountjoy created mutually supporting 
outposts along O’Neill’s border to hem him in. The English lord also waged total war on 
the Irish rebels and sought to destroy their food supplies with a series o f raids, often 
waterborne, that devastated the countryside, destroying crops, herds, and people. His 
lieutenant, Sir Arthur Chichester, reported the results o f one such raid. “We have burnt 
and destroyed along the Lough [Neagh], even within four miles of Dungannon, from 
whence we returned hither yesterday; in which journeys we have killed above one hundred 
people o f all sorts, besides such as were burnt, how many I know not. We spare none of 
what quality or sex soever, and it hath bred much terror in the people who heard not a 
drum nor saw not a fire there of a long time.” These raids also disrupted traditional
15 Ibid., 75.
16 Axtell, “Beyond the Pale;” Ellis, Tudor Ireland, 118, 124-25, 127; Hill, Celtic Warfare, 30-31; Falls, 
Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 253-58; Morton, Elizabethan Ireland, 86-87.
15
planting periods. “Being thus troubled in the Seede time, [they] could not sowe their 
ground.”17
Lord Mountjoy also studied his foe and turned their strengths into weaknesses. 
Recognizing the Irish dependence on terrain for shelter and sustenance, he chose to attack 
in winter, and by immobilizing the creaghts, reduced the Irish army’s mobility and ability to 
feed itself. “In Ireland the winter yieldeth best services, for there the trees are bare and 
naked, which use both to clothe and house the Keme, the ground is cold and wet which 
useth to be his bedding, the air is sharp and bitter which useth to blow through his naked 
sides and legs, the Kine are barren and without milk, which useth to be his only food.” 
Lacking the natural cover of the leafless woods, exposed to the elements, and short of 
food, the Irish were vulnerable to attack and defeat. Though Mountjoy did not experience 
success immediately, his changes and adaptations (and foolish moves by the rebel O’Neill 
at the battle of Kinsale in December 1601) allowed the English to effectively counter the 
Irish irregulars and eventually defeat them.18
England’s irregular education continued in the American colonies during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although regulars were largely absent before 1755. 
Many colonists immediately drew parallels between the Indians and the Irish based on 
perceived similarities in “barbaric” lifestyle and methods of warfare. In 1646, the Puritan 
minister Hugh Peter, an eye-witness to the Pequot War in 1637 and the Irish campaigns of 
the 1640s, recommended fighting the Indians in the same way as the Irish. “The wild Irish 
and the Indians doe not much differ and therefore would be handled alike.” Early Indian
17 Hill, Celtic Warfare, 30-31; Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 206; Morton, Elizabethan Ireland, 90-91, 
134-35.
16
conflicts, such as the Pequot War, demanded little change in European methods of war 
because of quick victory. But the Indians’ frequent and decisive victories in King Philip’s 
War in 1675-76 forced colonists to adapt.19
When hostilities broke out between Philip’s allies and the New England colonies in 
the summer of 1675, the colonists expected and sought to fight the Indians in 
conventional, open-field battles. Colonial militia units marched out to fight with flags 
flying and drums beating. But the Indians refused to oblige the colonists and instead 
“would immediately fly an hundred ways at once into swamps, so as our men could not 
follow them, or if they did, could not see two of them together.” The English derided such 
apparent cowardice, complaining that the Indians would “seldom or never” dare “to meet 
our Soldiers in the open Field, unless when they have a very great Advantage as to their 
numbers, or Covert o f the Woods and Bushes.”20
Using lightening-quick raids, “fast-moving, forest-wise Indian war parties were able 
to repeatedly baffle the ponderous English units, retreating successfully when necessary.” 
Able to avoid serious entanglements with colonial troops, Philip’s Indians attacked with 
impunity, ambushing, raiding, and retreating with little consequence to themselves. Like 
the Irish, the Indians retreated to the safety of the swamps, where the English could not 
follow without fear of ambush. These bogs were “so full of trees that a parcel of Indians 
may be within the length of a Pike of a Man, and he cannot discover them; and besides, this 
as well as all other swamps, is so soft Ground, that an Englishman can neither go nor stand
18 Axtell, “Beyond the Pale;” Ellis, Tudor Ireland, 118, 124-25, 127; Hill, Celtic Warfare, 31; Falls, 
Elizabeth’s Irish Wars, 253-58.
19 Raymond Phineas Steams, The Strenuous Puritan: Hugh Peters, 1598-1660 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois 
Press, 1954), 342.
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thereon.” What made this even more frustrating was the apparent ease with which the 
Indians traversed such terrain. “These bloody Savages will run along over it, holding their 
Guns cross their arms (and if occasion be) discharge in that position.” Samuel Gorton, 
recalling the Irish wars, complained that swamps were “more pernicious to valiant souldiers 
then are bullwarks, towers, Castles, and walled cities. I remember the time of the warres in 
Ireland . . . where much English blood was spilt by a people much like unto these . . . 
where many valiant souldiers lost their lives, both horse and foot, by means of woods, 
bushes, boggs, and quagmires.” Many colonial leaders believed it fruitless to even attempt 
to enter the swamps in pursuit. “It is ill fighting with a wild beast in his own den.”21
Despite the apparent futility of their own tactics, New Englanders were initially 
unwilling to adopt any Indian methods of war. Viewing the war as a battle to prevent their 
own degeneration into “savageness,” many colonists refused to adopt Indian ways, fearing 
this would be the first step toward losing their English identity. Opponents o f change 
acquired moral ammunition when Indians destroyed Captain Thomas Lathrop’s company 
on September 18, 1675. While escorting a supply train from Deerfield to Hatfield, 
Lathrop’s eighty men fell into an ambush set by a large force of Indians. In a well- 
intentioned attempt to fight the Indians on their own terms, Lathrop ordered his men to 
scatter among the trees and fight individually. Targeted one by one by the elusive Indians, 
fewer than ten of Lathrop’s men escaped with their lives. Reverend William Hubbard
20 Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 138-41; William Hubbard, The History o f the Indian Wars in New- 
England [1677], ed. Samuel G. Drake, 2 vols. (Roxbury, Mass: 1865), 112.
21 Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip ’s War (Hyannis, Mass: 
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lambasted the dead Lathrop for such foolish actions, claiming that if the captain had led his 
men forward en mass, he would have lost very few men. “For the Indians, notwithstanding 
their Subtleties and Cruelty, durst not look on Englishmen in the Face in the open Field, 
nor ever yet were known to kill any Man with their Guns, unless when they could lie in 
wait for him in an Ambush, or behind some Shelter, taking Aim undiscovered.”22
Fortunately for New England, Hubbard’s opinion was not universal, and various 
government leaders and private citizens made attempts to adapt Indian methods or entirely 
new ways of fighting. Governor John Leverett of Massachusetts Bay openly advocated 
adaptation, urging that the soldiers “bee commanded to attend the Enemies method, which 
though it may seeme a rout to ours, is the best way of fighting the Enemy in this brushy 
wilderness.” Some ideas, such as armored chariots, were ludicrous and represented the 
frustration and desperation felt by the colonists. Others brought in dogs for “finding out 
the enemy in their swamps,” to prevent ambush, and to warn settlements of intruders.23
The introduction of dogs was not a stroke of inspiration on the part o f the English 
settlers. Dogs had long served as weapons of war and defense and as forms of bloody 
entertainment. It was traditional in England to train mastiffs to fight, primarily “to baite the 
Beare, to baite the Bull and other such like cruell and bloudy beastes.” Aside from the 
Irish Wolfhound, the mastiff was the “lord of the hounds” in Britain, weighing over 150 
pounds and towering above other dogs at 30 inches in height. In his book O f Englishe
Historical Society, 1891), 630; Hubbard, History o f the Indian Wars, 72; Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 
141, 145.
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Dogges, Johanes Caius described the mammoth breed as “vaste, huge, stubbome, ougly, 
and eager, of a hevy and burthenous body . . . and frightfull to beholde . . . capable o f . . . 
striking colde feare into the harts of men, but standing in feare of no man.”24
The Spaniards were the first to let loose the dogs of war on the American natives, 
and the Iberians quickly turned the mastiffs brutal nature and immense physical power to 
terrorizing the Indians. Numerous contemporary historians, such as Bartolome de Las 
Casas, recorded the conquistadores' successes with hounds, and English translations of 
these works appeared in the publications of the cosmographer Richard Hakluyt and the 
historian Samuel Purchase in the early seventeenth century. English sailors, traders, and 
settlers applied the tactics pioneered by the Spaniards in their own conquest o f the new 
world, and dogs became an effective tool to counter the Indians’ advantages in forest 
warfare.25
Though writing twenty-five years after the conclusion of King Philip’s war, 
Reverend Solomon Stoddard recognized the usefulness of dogs that Governor Leverett’s 
contemporaries must have seen as well. “If dogs were trained up to hunt Indians as they 
doe Bears: we should quickly be sensible of a great advantage thereby . . . [The Indians] 
are not much afraid of us, they know they can take us and leave us . . . But these dogs 
would be such a terrour to them.” With sharp-nosed hounds to warn of ambush, the militia 
“would follow their dogs with an undaunted spirit, not fearing a surprise.” However,
24 Johannes Caius, OfEnglishe Dogges. . .  [1576] (London: A. Bradley, 1880), 23-26; Mark A. 
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25 Matromarino, “Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks,” 17-20; See also Francis de Ulloa, The First and Second 
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Stoddard must have felt a tinge of guilt for subjecting the Indians to such horrible 
treatment, and he justified the use of mastiffs by equating Indians with animals and 
accusing them of acting as “thieves and murderers.” “They act like wolves and are to be 
dealt withall as wolves.” And thus they were. On October 16, 1675, after capturing an 
Indian woman near Hatfield, Captain Samuel Moseley ordered the woman “to be tom in 
peeces by Doggs and she was soe dealt with.”26
While dogs may have frightened the Indians, the New Englanders’ greatest 
successes against Philip’s irregulars came from using friendly Indians as scouts, much as 
Mountjoy did with Irish, Scots, and Welsh natives. Indian allies minimized the threat and 
fear of ambush, inspiring greater confidence among the colonial troops. Indians also taught 
the English to move swiftly and quietly through the woods and were quick to correct 
mistakes. On one occasion, a Mohegan warrior leading a party of Connecticut soldiers 
made one man take off his squeaking shoes and had another dampen his leather breeches 
because they were rustling. One New Englander declared that friendly Indians had saved 
the colonies from dire consequences. “Had it not pleased god to draw forth some other 
Indeans (such as were) former enemies to our now enemies: to aid the English to finde 
their enemies: and overtake them (when the English cannot) we might have bin driven to 
great straits.”27
No New Englander was more successful in utilizing such friendly Indians in 
conjunction with English troops than Benjamin Church of Plymouth Colony. Church was
26 Solomon Stoddard to Joseph Dudley, Northampton, 22 October 1703, New-England Historical and 
Genealogical Register, 24 (1870): 269-70; Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 142; Malone, Skulking Way of 
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familiar with the marshy areas of his colony and neighboring Rhode Island, and, more 
important, he knew much about the Indians and saw the benefits of using their own tactics 
against them. Afler receiving a captain’s commission in the Plymouth militia, Church 
refused to remain penned up in towns or garrisons, so-called “Nests for Destruction,” and 
declared that he and his troops “would lye in the Woods as the Enemy did.” Instead, 
Church formed an independent company of “150 of the best Souldiers” and “100 of the 
Friend Indians” and sought the enemy “wherever they might lurk” in order “to beat them at 
their own tricks of forest warfare.”28
Church learned from the failures of previous English expeditions and implemented 
several unconventional changes. One such modification involved alternate firing. Typically 
the militia fired every weapon in a single volley, leaving the entire unit with unloaded 
weapons and vulnerable to attack. Church “called on his Men not to discharge all their 
Guns at once” in order to deny the Indians “an opportunity to run upon them with their 
Hatches.” Instead, by staggering volleys, a portion of his company’s weapons remained 
loaded and ready to resist assault. Another change restricted the personal habits of his 
men. Other English units’ attempts to ambush Indians had failed because of men “troubled 
with the Epidemical plague of lust after Tobacco.” Therefore, Church prohibited smoking 
while on his missions. He was also quite willing to learn from his Indian allies. On one 
occasion, Church asked an Indian how Philip’s people always got the better o f the English.
They told him, that the Indians gain’d great advantage of the English by
two things; the Indians always took care in their Marches and Fights, not to
27 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 153; Daniel Gookin, An Historical Account o f the Doings and 
Sufferings of the Christian Indians of New England, in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677 [1677] (New York: 
Amo Press, 1972), 441-42.
28 Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 145-46; Benjamin Church, The History of King Philip's War [1716] 
(Boston: John Kimball Wiggins, 1865), 67-68; Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 217.
22
come too thick together. But the English always kept in a heap together, 
that it was as easy to hit them as to hit an House. The other was, that if at 
any time they discovered a company of English Souldiers in the Woods, 
they knew that there was all, for the English never scattered; but the 
Indians always divided and scattered.
Church implemented this and thereafter spread out his command while marching through 
thick terrain. “Mr Church . . . order’d his little Company to March at double distance, to 
make as big a show (if they should be discovered) as might be.” Church’s tactics worked, 
and frequently when his company encountered the enemy, the hostile Indians fled,
“expecting the great Army.” Utilizing such methods, Church was often triumphant over
/
the Indians, and in the final phase of the war in summer 1676, Church fought, captured, 
and killed scattered bands of Philip’ s Indians, including the Wampanoag sachem, at little
i • 29cost to his own men.
Although no English regulars took part in King Philip’s War, the experiences of 
Benjamin Church and other colonists were not unknown to the people in England.
Between 1675 and 1682, London printers published fourteen different accounts o f the war 
in the form of letters, sermons, epic poems, and histories. Some of these appeared in the 
London Gazette only weeks after the war began. All of these accounts were popular with 
the reading public of England and most had at least moderate print runs. London 
booksellers aggressively advertised the tracts, listing them in the Term Catalogues, a 
brochure of London booksellers, or printed the stories as supplements to the London 
Gazette. Hundreds of unpublished, hand-copied newsletters circulated throughout England 
as well. Copies of the seventeen accounts printed in the colonies also made it across the 
ocean to London in the form of official narrations sent by colonial authorities to King
23
Charles or by colonists shipping books to friends and family in England. Church’s account, 
published by his son in 1716, circulated widely as well. Although designed to bolster the 
captain’s image and secure his place in history, the book recounted Church’s successful 
experiences with irregular warfare in such detail that, according to James Axtell, it “might 
well have served the New English [or even the English military] . . .  as a guide to the 
conduct of Indian warfare.” The large number and extensive circulation of accounts 
printed in England guaranteed exposure of the English military to American irregular 
warfare in at least a cursory manner.30
King Philip’s War was only the first in a long series of conflicts in the American 
colonies involving irregular warfare. Between Philip’s death in 1676 and George 
Washington’s ambush of French forces under Joseph Coulon de Villiers, sieur de 
Jumonville, in 1754, England fought three major wars in North America, known to the 
English as King William’s War (1689-97), Queen Anne’s War (1702-13), and King 
George’s War (1744-48). However, instead of facing only Indian foes, the English 
colonists fought French troops from Canada. This international threat to the colonies 
insured the attention but not the large-scale participation of the English government in the 
conflicts’ North American theater. With fierce fighting on the European continent and 
surrounding oceans, England left the colonies to conduct their own actions.
In each o f these colonial wars, France was far more effective in employing 
irregulars and Indians than were the English. During King William’s War, French officers 
led numerous Franco-Indian war parties in attacks on English settlements. Louis de 
Buade, comte de Frontenac, governor of New France, planned an ambitious campaign to
29 Church, History of King Philip’s War, 28, 32-33, 121-22; Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 146-48.
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take Albany and New York in 1690. Diverted by lack of support, his parties instead raided 
Schenectady, New York, killing sixty inhabitants; Salmon Falls, New Hampshire, killing 
thirty and capturing fifty-four; and Fort Loyal, destroying a force of one hundred 
militiamen. Frontenac’s forces overran sixteen additional frontier posts.31
English colonists mounted a two-pronged retaliatory strike that same year, with a 
seaborne expedition directed against Acadia and an overland strike against Montreal via 
Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. Fitz-John Winthrop, a veteran of the English 
Civil War, led a makeshift army of New York and Connecticut troops on the overland 
route but only made it as far as Wood Creek, south of Lake Champlain, where a shortage 
of provisions and an outbreak of smallpox forced them to retreat before ever sighting a 
Frenchman. Winthrop’s Mohawk allies, advancing toward Montreal, suffered a costly 
defeat at the hands of a strong force of French regulars.32
Four years after the failed English attempt on Montreal, the French struck again. 
Pierre Le Moyne, sieur D ’Iberville, led a series of raids on English outposts in the Hudson 
Bay region. Forts Hayes, Rupert, Albany, York, and Nelson all fell to Iberville, followed 
by all o f Newfoundland. In the last year of King William’s War, 1697, incessant Franco- 
Indian raids devastated the English colonies’ border settlements. Mixed bands penetrated 
as far as Andover and Haverhill near Boston and left the towns in shambles.33
Seven years later, in the midst of Queen Anne’s War, the French and Indians 
conducted one of their most notorious raids, striking the outlying settlement of Deerfield,
30 Lepore, Name o f War, 49-52, 55, 58; Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 145.
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Massachusetts. The town’s location on the outer fringes of English settlement left it prone 
to attack. But even more dangerous to the town’s safety was one of its own residents, the 
outspoken Puritan minister John Williams. The French had targeted him for capture in 
order to exchange him for a high-ranking French prisoner in English hands. To capture 
their prize, Jean-Baptiste Hertel de Rouville and Pierre Boucher led a force of forty-eight 
French soldiers and two hundred Abenakis, Caughnawaga Mohawks, and Hurons nearly 
three hundred miles in the midst of winter to attack Deerfield.34
After traveling down frozen Lake Champlain, over the Green Mountains, and down 
the Connecticut River Valley, the Indian and French force lay quietly outside of Deerfield 
on the morning of February 29, 1704. After leaving their packs and equipment in a cache 
several miles away, the raiding party quietly crept into town and was inside the main 
stockade and beating down doors before the English settlers could raise the alarm. “The 
enemy came in like a flood upon us,” reminisced John Williams in his popular captivity 
narrative. Several Indians broke into his home, captured or killed his family, and rifled his 
possessions as he stood by helplessly. Several families barricaded themselves inside 
Sergeant Benoni Stebbins’s cabin and poured such a devastating fire into the raiders’ ranks 
that they left the house untouched. “About sun an hour high” the raiders left town with 
over one hundred captives, including Williams, and left behind forty-seven dead settlers and 
numerous burning buildings. A force of English militiamen from nearby towns pursued the 
attackers and managed to kill several before falling into an ambush. The raiders quickly
34 Samuel Carter, “The Route of the French and Indian Army that Sacked Deerfield, Feb. 29th, 1703-04 
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departed with their captives and wounded comrades and began the long trek back to 
Quebec. In this classic example of irregular warfare, the French and Indian attackers 
traveled an incredible distance over rough terrain, struck their enemy with no warning, 
inflicted heavy personal casualties, dealt a devastating psychological blow, and lost fewer 
than twenty men of their own.35
If the English military had learned nothing from John Williams and the Deerfield 
raid, from Benjamin Church, or the centuries of conflict in Ireland, the European wars of 
the 1740s provided a virtual “schoolhouse” for instruction in irregular warfare. Maria 
Theresa’s struggle to secure the throne of the Austrian Empire from 1740-48 witnessed a 
transformation of European warfare, where irregulars began playing a more significant role 
than in previous wars of that century. When Frederick the Great’s Prussian army invaded 
Austrian Silesia in 1740, Maria Theresa desperately called on the nobles of Hungary and 
the Balkans for support. The Hungarian horsemen and “wild and barbaric” Croats who 
responded were unlike any other soldiers in Europe.36
The Balkans and Hungary had been a battleground between Christian Europe and 
the Muslim Ottomans for centuries. Seeking to expand their empire, the Turks waged a 
brutal war against the people of southeastern Europe. A unit frequently used by the Turks
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in these wars, the akinjs, or Tartar light horsemen, was known for its mobility and 
unpredictability. These riders fought for plunder and captives instead of wages.37
In response to the Turks’ mobile strikers, the Balkan nobles formed their own 
irregulars, known as grenzers (border guards) o rpandours (mounted policemen). Raised 
and maintained on a local basis, the grenzers patrolled the eastern frontier o f Christian 
Europe, clearing pockets o f Turks from Balkan territory and frequently raiding Turkish 
holdings. As recently as 1737-39, grenzers and pandours had fought alongside Field 
Marshal Seckerdorf s Austrian army in an unsuccessful war against the Turks. It was many 
of these men, hardened veterans from years of border conflict, who rode against Frederick 
in 1740.38
While these irregulars could not prevent Frederick’s conquest of Silesia or force the 
French to abandon their invasion of Austria, small units, such as Franz von der Trenck’s 
dreaded pandours, constantly harassed and chipped away at the invading armies. Isolated 
units, weakly guarded supply trains, and unfortified towns all fell prey to the Austrian 
“banditti,” so enraging Frederick that he threatened to execute Trenck and his “barbarians” 
if he captured them. This particular threat probably stemmed from Trenck’s raid on 
Frederick the Great’s quarters and the capture of the king’s personal silver service. 
Frederick’s French allies suffered just as severely from the stings of partisan units. After 
abandoning the siege of Prague in 1742, the French marched their invading force through
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rough mountainous terrain to join the main army in Germany. The Austrian commander 
did not let his enemy retreat gracefully and “ordered . . . 5000 Hussars to harass them 
during their whole route.” A French officer on the long march complained of the incessant 
Austrian strikes, claiming that he faced “Hussars in Flank, Front, and Rear all the way.”39
Similar irregular forces bewildered the Spanish invaders of Sardinia-Piedmont in 
northwest Italy in 1742. Faced by overwhelming numbers, the Sardinian king recruited 
peasants and highlanders to harass the Spanish advance. Frequent skirmishes and 
ambushes, along with severe winter weather, took a serious toll on the Spanish army, 
which was “continuously harassed by the Vandours and light Troops, who infested their 
Rear.” By 1745, Spain could no longer absorb such punishment and began a withdrawal 
from Piedmont. But like the French in Austria, the Spanish army was “so harassed [by 
Sardinians] in its Retreat out of Piedmont, that not above 8000 Men were brought off.” In 
their haste to escape their tormenters, the Spanish left “most o f their Cannons, Mortars, 
and heavy Baggage” for the Sardinians to confiscate. The British did not ignore their 
beleaguered Sardinian allies. The army sent General Handasyde and one thousand “English 
Swiss” to fight alongside the peasants and highlanders of Sardinia.40
The Sardinian, Hungarian, and Balkan irregulars were so effective in their efforts to 
deny unhindered movement, provisions, and intelligence to their enemies that the Prussians, 
French, and Spanish all found it prudent to counter with irregulars o f their own. Frederick 
the Great quickly saw the value of such forces. Following his victory at Mollwitz in 1741,
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“where he experienced and recognized his lack of such units, he made it his first task to
strengthen his army with light troops . . . His example was followed by the French, the
Hanoverians, and the Saxons, all of whom founded units o f this branch of the service.”
Frederick formed units of jagers, while France organized chasseurs to match the Austrian
grenzers and pandours. Recruiters sought out hunters and gamekeepers to fill the ranks
of the new irregulars, men skilled in marksmanship and used to the conditions of forests
and other rough terrain. The Spanish created a regiment of light horse from Italian
criminals, “smugglers well acquainted with the byways,” and a regiment o f infantry “most
of them from the Romagna [a mountainous region] to make use of against the Pandours
and Croats, and the enemy’s other irregular forces.”41
Beyond the token force under General Handasyde and the detailed battle accounts
read in The Scots Magazine and The Gentlemen’s Magazine and Historical Chronicle,
Britain’s participation in the early irregular warfare of Europe was minimal. This changed
when a British army joined Austria’s western army in Flanders in summer 1743. Of the
sixty-two thousand Austrians under Prince Charles of Loraine, irregular horse and foot
numbered over seven thousand. Included among the irregulars was “the famous Col.
Metzel at the head of a large Body of irregular Troops.” His pandours, inherited from
Trenck, had “made . . . much Noise in the World” with their successful campaigns against
the French. An English officer described in detail his shocked reaction to his new allies.
[The] irregular Troops . . . Croats, Hussars, Pandours etc . . . are encamped 
by themselves . . . and their looks represent a wild and Savage Fierceness.
All Night they lie on the Ground without Tents or Straw; in the Day they
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Dance and exercise themselves with running and throwing of Stones of 20 
lb. Weight. . . They openly declare th a t . . . they will give no Quarter wither 
to Man or Child . . . Yesterday a Body of about 1000 . . . cut in pieces some 
Frenchmen . . . and brought away their Heads.
While appreciating the pandours' effectiveness, British officers were shocked by the
irregulars’ rejection of conventional laws of war and by the atrocities they committed,
especially Trenck’s habit of keeping severed enemy heads as trophies. In their rush to
judgment, the British leaders conveniently forgot their ancestors’ habits of doing the same
in Ireland. Fear of divine wrath caused some British officers, such as Lieutenant Colonel
Charles Russell of the Coldstream Guards, to dread the day that the British army would
employ such troops of their own. “I should almost believe there would some judgement
befall if we were to employ such in our service, unless the utmost necessity required it.”42
Although British leaders apparently felt that “the utmost necessity” had not arrived
in 1744, they continued to feel the bite of irregulars as the French under Marshal Maurice
de Saxe gained experience and proficiency with their own guerrillas. Saxe’s irregulars
constantly harassed British forces with great success during the Flanders campaign. On
one occasion in 1744, a party of Saxe’s partisans “laid an Ambush to intercept” the routine
relief o f British guards at Lanoi. “They posted their men in a thick Copse on one Side of
the Road, and behind a Hedge on the other.” The commander of the relief column received
warning of the ambush and sent an advanced guard of thirty men, “but [only] a Serjeant
and twelve Men to beat the Hedges on the Flanks.” The British flankers missed the French
force, which “lay undiscovered, till it fired on the advanced Guard.” Although surprised,
the ambush did not shock British leaders. The commander’s precautions, though obviously
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insufficient, indicated a familiarity with guerilla tactics and methods for countering them. 
Instead of accusing the French of using “uncivil” tactics, “the Colonel was . . . blamed for 
not having more Men on the Flank, [and] for being so negligent.”43
After observing and, more frequently, suffering from irregular tactics throughout 
the 1740s, the time of “the utmost necessity” finally arrived for Britain to utilize its own 
irregular forces in 1745. Charles Stuart, the Young Pretender to the throne of Britain, 
arrived in Scotland --for the first time in his life— to reclaim the crown stolen from his 
grandfather James II in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. With a large number of the 
Highland clans rising to support him, Charles had a ready-made army, and the British army 
suddenly faced an extremely ferocious enemy skilled in the art of irregular warfare.
For the Highland Scots, guerilla warfare was a way of life. Like the Irish, the Scots 
frequently made their livelihood by thieving from their neighbor’s cattle herds, and periodic 
blood feuds between clans ensured sporadic raids and ambushes. While guerrilla tactics 
were their forte, the Highlanders were formidable on the battlefield as well. But instead of 
trading volleys of musket fire, the kilted Scots preferred the shock and close action of the 
Highland charge. Advancing in ragged lines, the Highlanders would fire a single volley at 
short range, throw down their muskets, draw their broadswords, and “dart with fury on the 
enemy through the smoke of their fire.” “Their attack is so terrible,” wrote James 
Johnstone, a Jacobite staff officer, “that the best troops in Europe would with difficulty
43 The Operations of the British, and the Allied Armies, During the Campaigns o f1743 and 1744. . .  By 
an Eyewitness (London: 1744), 47-48.
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sustain the first shock of it, and if the Swords of the Highlanders come in contact with 
them, their defeat is inevitable.”44
Johnstone’s predictions of Highland victory came true in the first major battles of 
the ‘Forty-Five Rebellion. At Prestonpans and Falkirk, the Highland charge destroyed the 
British battle lines in a matter of minutes. Although Prince Charles’s greatest victories 
came on the battlefield, the Scottish rebels depended on irregular tactics throughout the 
prince’s failed bid for the throne. Soon after the Young Pretender arrived in Scotland, his 
supporters initiated a guerilla war on the English. On August 16, 1745, a small party of 
Scots under Macdonald of Keppock and Cameron of Lockiel ambushed two companies of 
Royal Scots marching from Fort William to Fort Augustus in the northwestern Highlands. 
Startled by the sudden attack, the regulars broke and ran. “By their sudden and unexpected 
attack the troops were struck with such an unaccountable panick as with consent to run of 
without so much as taking time to observe the number of quality o f their enemy.” The 
Highlanders chased the fleeing redcoats for nearly a mile, killing twelve before the 
remaining eighty surrendered.45
The following month, while besieging Edinburgh castle, Prince Charles sent small 
raiding parties into the surrounding lowlands to attack English supporters, gather badly 
needed supplies, and keep the restless Highland clans occupied. “Small Parties . . . went 
several Ways into the Country, pilfering and stealing all they could lay Hands on.” Other
44 John Prebble, Culloden (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1961), 37-40; James Johnstone, A Memoir of the 
‘Forty-Five, ed. Brian Rawson (London: Folio Society, 1958), 82-83.
45 Robert Fitzroy Bell, ed., Memoirs o f John Murray o f Broughton, sometime Secretary to Prince Charles 
Edward 1740-1747 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1898), 166; Fortescue, History of the British 
Army, 1:126.
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groups of Highlanders traveled great distances from the Jacobite army to surprise and 
capture several English outposts.46
These stinging attacks eroded the English army’s confidence, and soldiers began to 
expect attacks in the most secure locations. “Conceiving themselves insecure everywhere, 
they were obliged to redouble their service in the midst o f winter.” Samuel Boyse, an 
English historian, chose to put these protective measures in a better light, claiming that the 
Jacobite attacks “only served to put our Troops more upon their Guard to prevent such 
surprises in their Quarters for the future.”47
Whether the Jacobite tactics spurred change out of fear or merely prudence, British 
military leaders quickly adapted to Highland methods and countered with their own. Soon 
Prince Charles’s men came to respect the British regulars’ ability to move and fight in the 
rough Highland terrain. Occasionally the regulars successfully reversed roles and 
ambushed the Scots. In March 1746, a detachment of regulars “surprised a Party of the 
Argylshire Highlanders . . . whoe were all either killed or made Prisoners. Two small 
Detachments o f the same Body . . . underwent a like fate.” John Campbell, the earl of 
Loudon, numbered among the Scots loyal to the house of Hanover. When hostilities 
erupted in 1745, he was in the midst of forming a Highland regiment for service in the 
British army. Loudon turned this regiment against the Jacobites with great success, 
earning him the wary respect o f the rebels. In his memoirs o f the rebellion, the chevalier de
46 Boyse, An Important History of the Late Rebellion in 1745. From Authentic Memoirs; Particularly, the 
Journal o f a General Officer (London: 1748), 72; James Ray, The Complete History o f the Rebellion.
From its First Rise, in 1745, to its total Suppression at the Glorious Battle o f Culloden, in April, 1746 
([York]: 1754), 48; Robert Forbes, comp., The Lyon in Mourning, or A Collection o f Speeches, Letters, 
Journals Etc. Relative to the Affairs o f Prince Charles Edward Stuart, 3 vols., Scottish Historical Society 
Publications, vol. 20-22 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1895), I: 91-92.
47 Johnstone, Memoir of the Forty-Five, 108-109; Boyse, History of the Late Rebellion, 72.
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Johnston, one of Prince Charles’s staff officers, frequently remarked on Loudon’s success. 
“Lord Loudoun with his corps frequently harassed and annoyed us and he sent detachments 
across the arm of the sea between himself and us, keeping us continually on the alert.”48 
Loudon’s harassment of the rebels increased in 1746. Following the Jacobites’ 
disastrous defeat at Culloden in April, battlefield encounters disappeared from the war and 
the fighting became exclusively irregular. The rebel army scattered throughout the 
Highlands to continue the struggle, protect Prince Charles as he scampered into exile, or 
simply to return home. Small bands of Jacobites and regulars continually pecked at one 
another, with the regulars usually coming out on top. The duke of Cumberland, newly 
dubbed “Butcher” after his troops slaughtered the fleeing Highlanders at Culloden, actively 
pursued the fleeing rebels with irregulars of his own. “The Rebels being now dispersed all 
over the Highlands, and skulking in secret Comers, Detachments were sent from the 
Duke’s Army, and encamped at different Places for Greater Safety of the Country, and 
Convenience of apprehending the Rebels.” Loudon and his loyal Highlanders were 
especially skilled at this task, ranging “the Country, carrying Fire and Desolation as they 
passed, shooting the vagrant Highlanders they met in the mountains, and driving off the 
Cattle.” These redcoated Highlanders and many other regulars became very proficient in 
mountain warfare, often surprising bands of Jacobites in their isolated hideaways. “They 
are greatly surpris’d,” wrote a British officer, “to find our soldiers climb over their rocks 
and mountains full as nimble as they can themselves, and bring cattle from places which 
they deem’d inaccessible to us.” The ‘Forty-Five proved to be the practical application of
48 Forbes, Lyon in Mourning, I: 256-57, 357; Boyse, History o f the Late Rebellion, 147; [Francis Douglas], 
The History o f the Rebellion in 1745 and 1746, exacted from the Scots Magazine (Aberdeen: 1755), 174; 
Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness,” 637; Johnstone, Memoirs o f the ‘Forty-Five, 109.
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the lessons learned by the British army in the continental campaigns of the 1740s. Whether 
fending off Highlanders with redcoated regulars or commanding their own guerilla warriors 
composed of Scots loyalists, the British army gained valuable experience in countering and 
utilizing irregular tactics in the Highlands of Scotland.49
The bitter experiences in Scotland and on the continent, as well as the 
popularization of irregular warfare, caused a flurry of writing on the subject, both in 
popular literature and technical treatises. Reprints of personal letters and other firsthand 
accounts of the exploits of pandours, Highlanders, and hussars appeared in newspapers and 
magazines throughout the British Isles and even as far away as the American colonies. The
Boston Weekly News-Letter and The Boston Evening Post as well as all of London’s papers
\
frequently printed accounts of the raids and skirmishes. The Scots Magazine and The 
Gentlemen's Magazine carried many detailed descriptions o f the battles as well as reprints 
of officers’ letters and occasionally official dispatches. For those officers relegated to 
garrison and staff duties far from the fighting, these popular accounts provided detailed 
information on irregular warfare, and according to historian Peter Russell, the personal 
correspondence of officers and the subscription lists o f such magazines reveal that many 
army officers were regular readers.50
For officers desiring more serious literature on the subject of irregular warfare, the 
1740s and 1750s saw a resurgence of technical works on warfare. These treatises were not 
limited to discussions on training, drill, and linear tactics; ancillary topics such as “the
49 Forbes, Lyon in Mourning, II: 109; Ray, Complete History o f the Rebellion, 347-48; [Douglas], History 
of the Rebellion, 244; Boyse, History of the Late Rebellion, 120; Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness,” 
690.
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service o f partisans, or ranging companies” were the focus o f many works. Franz von der 
Trenck published his Memoirs in 1747. Although he was fond of recounting his exploits of 
the boudoir as much as the battlefield, Trenck produced a valuable and entertaining work 
on partisan warfare that circulated widely. La Croix followed in 1752 with his famous 
Traite de la Petite Guerre, and Lancelot, comte Turpin de Crisse with Essai sur I f  Art de 
la Guerre in 1754. Both works focused almost exclusively on partisan warfare and 
provided guidance and valuable advice for the curious officer. Of the two, Crisse’s was the 
more valuable. As an experienced French hussar officer, Crisse advocated the creation of 
professional light troops rather than dependence on the “banditti” who frequently 
populated such units. His Essai described many aspects of irregular warfare, ranging from 
operations in rough and mountainous terrain to how to conduct—and avoid— ambushes. In 
essence, “the work was a practical handbook for troops involved in petite guerre.”51
British officers showed an intense interest in theoretical and practical advancements 
in warfare, and “foreign campaigns, regulations, and treatises were constantly referred to, 
and drawn on, by British authors.” Translations of La Croix, Crisse, and other 
contemporary authors, “chiefly from the French and German, were commonplace: the main 
Prussian and French regulations appeared in English, as did the works of most 
distinguished foreign soldiers,” including Frederick the Great and Marshal Saxe. The 
subscription requests for the books and the changes evident in units during their annual 
reviews and exercises indicate that the bulk of this literature circulated widely in the British
50 The Boston Evening-Post, 1 April 1745, 8 April 1745, 6 May 1745, 27 July 1745, 7 October 1745, 21 
October 1745, 4 November 1745; Boston Weekly News-Letter 24 September 1741; Russell, “Redcoats in 
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51 J. A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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military. A 1768 work by Captain Bennett Cuthbertson, though published after the initial 
flurry, is representative of the extent of circulation of similar monographs. Of 
approximately 2,600 regular army officers in 1768, 939 subscribed to Cuthbertson’s book, 
“ranging from the C.-in-C. Granby to the lowest ‘2nd Surgeon’—exclusive of militia officers 
and private subscribers.”52
Officers new to the military—often mere boys—were encouraged to read as much of 
this literature as possible. Colonel James Wolfe, later conqueror of Quebec, offered such 
advice in 1756 to Thomas Townshend, whose brother was purchasing an army 
commission. Foremost on Wolfe’s list was Comte de Turpin’s work, which was “certainly 
worth looking into, as it contains a good deal of plain practice.” He continued with a 
lengthy list (more than any boy would read) including “the ‘Memoirs’ of the Marquis de 
Santa Cruz, Fenquieres, and Montecucculi,” commentaries on classical works on warfare, 
and accounts of other European military heroes such as Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII of 
Sweden, and “Zisca the Bohemian.” At the close of the letter, Wolfe mentioned La Croix’s 
slim but significant work. “There is a little volume, entitled ‘Tratie de la Petite Guerre,’ 
that your brother should take in his pocket when he goes upon out-duty and detachments.” 
Wolfe undoubtedly took the book during his “out-duty” to North American shortly after,
53and it is not unreasonable to conclude that many other British officers did the same.
Whether these technical works or the centuries of exposure to irregular warfare in 
Ireland, North America, and Europe truly prepared British officers and soldiers for North 
American warfare has been the subject of debate among historians. In his 1948 biography
52 Houlding, Fit for Service, 167-70.
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of George Washington, Douglas Freeman doubted that the British officers were anything 
other than narrow-minded martinets, automatons who responded in programmed ways 
without deviation. “[Braddock] lacked all originality o f mind and exemplified . . .  a system 
traditional, methodical and inflexible.” Furthermore, Freeman claimed that Braddock, and 
all European officers including Marshal Saxe, were ignorant of irregular warfare, “a type of 
warfare with which he was unfamiliar,” because European warfare was confined to 
traditional methods. Freeman completely ignored Saxe’s role as a proponent of irregulars 
and flexible leadership, the extensive irregular warfare in eighteenth-century Europe, or the 
experience of one of Braddock’s regiments. The Forty-Fourth Foot, under Sir Peter 
Halket, which after suffering defeat at Prestonpans in 1745 successfully fought the Scottish 
rebels throughout the remainder of the war, both on the field and in the Highlands.54
The tendency to label British officers as fools continued with Howard Peckham, 
who described the British as “unresourceful, inefficient, and even stupid.” Peckham labeled 
Lord Loudon, who so successfully fought the Jacobites and whose tenure in North 
America was marked with significant changes and modifications to the army, as 
“unimaginative.” At the same time, he praised the “successes” of Governor Shirley of 
Massachusetts, “this extraordinary civilian,” who failed in his 1755 expedition against Fort 
Niagara, built a weak fort on Lake Ontario next to already decrepit Fort Oswego, and 
failed to adequately garrison, supply, or support the isolated outposts. Guy Fregault, the 
French-Canadian historian, also contributed to this image, labeling the British officer corps
53 James Wolfe to Thomas Townshend, Devizes, 18 July 1756, Willson, Life and Letters o f Wolfe, 296-97. 
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as an example of “manifest incompetence.” Douglas Leach agreed as well, but contradicted 
his own conclusions. While Leach avoided the loaded descriptors used by other scholars, 
he agreed that the British experiences in Europe and Scotland did not prepare them for 
America. “The conditions o f warfare in the vast and dense American forest required 
special techniques and practices unfamiliar to European troops.” However, immediately 
following this declaration, Leech admitted that Braddock “was no fool” and he and other 
British officers took proper precautions to counter the threats posed by Indian warriors and 
the harsh terrain. Unless previous experience had taught the British officers to act in such 
a manner, these actions must constitute either blind luck or the work of Providence.55
Armstrong Starkey avoided the pitfalls that entrapped Freeman, Peckham, and 
Leach by examining the European experiences of the British army instead of ignoring them 
and making broad and often foundationless declarations. Like the others, Starkey argued 
that North American warfare was foreign to the British military and European models of 
irregular warfare (peasant insurrections, people in arms, and irregulars as auxiliaries to 
regular forces) were inapplicable. The closest example to North America, Starkey 
reasoned, was “people in arms.” Similar to a popular uprising against government forces, 
the “people in arms” model was fairly substantial, well organized, and planned in detail, 
such as the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745. But even the guerrilla warfare of the 
Highlands in 1745-46 was in no way similar to North American warfare, claimed Starkey, 
and British officers “would have not learned many specific tactical lessons that could be 
applied to North America.” While Scots were ferocious irregulars like the Indians, they
55 Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 1689-1762 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), 141-53; 
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relied on the charge and close combat to decide the battle. In contrast, the Indians relied 
on marksmanship and normally retreated to avoid the bayonet, claimed Starkey. “Thus, 
officers with Scottish experience had little, if any, exposure to anything like the Indian 
‘skulking way of war’” and no example of European irregular conflict “provided an 
adequate model for the conditions of North American forest warfare.” While Starkey was 
correct that North American warfare differed from that of Europe, he admitted that 
encounters with alternate forms of warfare or exposure to them in theory could alleviate 
the lack of first-hand experience. “Theory does not have to be directly applicable; it has 
value if it simply opens the mind to new possibilities and new contingencies.” And this is 
exactly what the British experiences o f the previous six hundred years did.56
North American warfare was new to the British army. Regulars had never fought 
in large numbers in North America before 1755 and few had faced Indians. However, the 
principles of irregular warfare were the same: move swiftly, strike with the advantage, and 
retreat when necessary. Whether Balkan pandours, Scottish Highlanders, or Shawnee 
Indians, small, mobile groups relied on concealment and surprise to defeat their enemies 
with the least cost to themselves. American folklore “has tended to obscure” this fact in 
efforts to build the legends of American superiority at the cost of the redcoats’ reputation. 
Much of this image of the bumbling “bullocks” in the wilderness originated with 
Braddock’s defeat in 1755. But “British leaders were not obtuse,” claimed historian Daniel 
Beattie. “They recognized the central problem early on; b u t . . . they were not successful 
immediately.” It was this lack of instant victory that has led historians to declare the
Press, 1969), 94-96; Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 
1607-1763 (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1973), 368.
56 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 47-53.
41
British uneducated in the ways of la petite guerre. This image of Braddock (and for that 
matter any British officer) as a “fool, unwilling to adapt to American conditions . . . [who] 
stupidly forced his men to fight in the European manner . . .  is nonsense.” In fact, British 
leaders, including the much-maligned Braddock, arrived in America with a comprehensive 
education in irregular warfare and acted with “vigor and skill.” During the six hundred 
years before the Seven Years’ War, the British army had “ample opportunity to observe, 
combat, and occasionally conduct guerrilla tactics.” The enormous volume of printed 
material on the subject, whether John Williams’s captivity narrative, Benjamin Church’s 
“manual” for Indian warfare, newspaper and magazine articles, or professional treatises, 
conveyed the lessons of the past and provided supplemental or replacement education for 
those officers lacking personal experience. Admittedly, British officers lacked “firsthand 
experience of the American wilderness and its fighting men. [But they] were well aware of 
the military problems which they posed.” The performance of British officers and soldiers 
in North America during the Seven Years’ War would prove their competence, and if not 
for a momentary lapse in diligence, General Braddock might have been a hero instead of a 
goat.57
57 Edward Pierce Hamilton, “Colonial Warfare in North American,” Proceedings o f the Massachusetts 
Historical Society, vol. 80 (Boston: The Society, 1969), 7; Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness,” 629-44; 
John K. Mahon, “Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794,” Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, 45 (June 1958-March 1959): 254; Daniel J. Beattie, “The Adaption of the British Army to 
Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763,” in Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century, 
ed. Maarten Ultee (University, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1986), 57-59.
II
DEFEAT ON THE MONONGAHELA
Another time we shall know better how to deal with them.
Edward Braddock
During the eighteenth century, the hazily-defined region known as the Ohio country 
lay at the heart of the North American conflict between Great Britain and France. Wedged 
between French Canada on the north, the British colonies to the east, and the Mississippi 
River to the west, the Ohio country occupied a region considered strategically and 
economically valuable to both Britain and France. Both European powers and several 
colonies extended conflicting claims over the territory, and the Ohio figured prominently in 
government policies of each. Its vast tracts o f land, natural wealth in furs, and many Indian 
inhabitants promised an economic boon to whomever could control it. Beyond material 
wealth, the entity that controlled the Ohio’s valuable waterways guaranteed itself enhanced 
expansion while containing its opponent.58
France suffered a setback in the colonial competition following the Peace of 
Utrecht in 1713. Forced to cede portions of Hudson Bay, Newfoundland, and Acadia to 
Britain, and fearful of further encroachment by English settlers, France sought to 
strengthen New France’s internal defenses by linking its colonies in Canada and Louisiana 
with a string of forts along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers (see fig. 5). “It is of the
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greatest importance to check the progress of the claims and enterprises of the English . . . 
Were they to succeed . . . they would cut the communication of the two colonies o f Canada 
and Louisiana,” wrote Antoine-Louis Rouille, comte de Jouy. This became a reality under 
Ange Duquesne de Menneville, Marquis Duquesne, governor general o f New France. By 
1753, French forts stretched from Montreal to Niagara Falls, through western 
Pennsylvania, from Presqu’ile on Lake Eire, to Fort Le Boeuf, to the Indian village of 
Venango. Their next intended post would guard the Forks o f the Ohio.59
British colonial authorities warily eyed the French expansion, which they considered 
a territorial encroachment. The British derived their claim to the region from colonial 
charters, European diplomacy, and Indian treaties. Under the provisions o f the Treaty o f 
Utrecht in 1713, the British gained nominal ownership of the Ohio. Specifically, Article 
Fifteen of the treaty stated that “the subjects of France, inhabitants o f Canada and 
elsewhere, should not disturb or molest in any manner whatever the five Indian nations 
[Iroquois] which are subject to Great Britain, nor its other American allies.” Because the 
Iroquois claimed the Ohio by right of conquest (a tenuous claim at best), the region fell 
under British auspices. This was reinforced by treaty in 1744 when the Iroquois ceded the 
territory to Britain.60
On these grounds, and for personal profit associated with the Ohio Company, 
Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia dispatched Major George Washington, adjutant
58 John Keegan, Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 105- 
OS; “The Morris Journal,” 18-22; Paul E. Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela (Pittsburgh, Penn: 
Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 19-20.
59 Francis Jennings, Empire o f Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1988), 51; Keegan, Fields o f Battle, 105-08; Sargent, History o f an 
Expedition, 18-22; Kopperman, Braddock, 19-20.
60 Sargent, History o f an Expedition, 18; Keegan, Fields o f Battle, 107; Michael N. McConnell, A Country 
Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1992).
44
general of the Virginia militia, to Fort Le Boeuf in December 1753 to formally demand 
French withdrawal. The French commander met the demand with a civil but outright 
refusal. Dinwiddie quickly responded, and in January 1754 he ordered a fort built at the 
Forks of the Ohio to prevent further French encroachment.61
Marching to the Forks with reinforcements in May, Washington received word of 
the newly-constructed stockade’s capture by the French, who promptly constructed a 
stronger fort and named it Duquesne. Still intent on making a show of force, Washington 
remained in the region. On May 27, his forces ambushed a small party of Frenchmen. 
Fearful o f retribution, the Virginians retreated to a makeshift stockade named Fort 
Necessity in the Great Meadow of Pennsylvania. Here, in July 1755, the French easily 
defeated Washington and sent his small army back to Virginia.62
Washington’s defeat caused much consternation among the British leadership. 
Response to France’s aggression was necessary and justified, they thought, but 
diplomatically tricky. Despite obviously hostile intentions by both sides, France and Britain 
were technically at peace. In order to maintain that fragile status, the British leaders 
cloaked their response under the guise of self-defense. Under the direction of the duke of 
Cumberland, captain general o f the British Army, the British government devised a grand 
scheme to reclaim and secure disputed territory in North America, all “in the name of 
territorial integrity.”63
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The four targets o f this campaign were geographically remote from one another. 
Foremost was the capture of Fort Duquesne at the Forks o f the Ohio. Next in importance 
was the French post Fort Niagara. This bastion, on territory claimed by New York and the 
Iroquois League, guarded the water and land connections between Lake Ontario and Lake 
Erie, and its capture would sever New France’s western outposts from Montreal. Fort St. 
Frederick on Lake Champlain controlled the Champlain Valley route from Albany to 
Montreal. In previous wars, France used this as a staging area for attacks into New York 
and New England. Finally, the British sought to capture Fort Beausejour in Nova Scotia. 
Located on disputed ground connecting the Acadian peninsula to the mainland, this post 
served as a base of support for the disgruntled French-Acadian population, now under 
British rule. Because the British claimed each location as their own, they could conceivably 
attack yet maintain a “treaty-saving posture.”64
Preparations for this massive campaign began in Britain in late 1754. The duke of 
Cumberland took a direct hand in all planning. He first selected Major General Edward 
Braddock, a singularly undistinguished man, to serve as commander-in-chief of British 
forces in America and personally lead the advance on Fort Duquesne. The sixty-year-old 
Braddock had served in the aristocratic Coldstream Guards for forty-four years, and 
despite this lengthy term of service, had never seen battle. “Before his name had become 
immortal. . . [he] had not done anything to earn himself a place in the chronicles of the 
times.” His personal secretary, William Shirley, Junior, son of the Massachusetts governor, 
expressed a rather harsh opinion of Braddock in a letter to Governor Robert Morris of
64 Sketch for the Operations in North America, memorandum, 16 November 1754, Military Affairs in 
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Pennsylvania. “We have a G—  most judiciously chosen for being disqualified for the 
service he is employed in, in almost every respect. He may be brave for ought I know and 
he is honest in pecuniary affairs . . . [but] a little more ability and a little less honesty upon 
the present occasion might serve our turn better.” In spite of such comments from a young 
gentleman, inexperienced in military affairs, Braddock was a competent administrator and 
was well-versed in standard European tactics. His future performance would demonstrate 
his qualification, until a momentary, disastrous lapse guaranteed his reputation eternal 
damnation.65
The soldiers selected by Cumberland were an entirely different matter. Typical of 
post-war demilitarization, Britain’s peacetime army in the 1750s was in a poor state. In 
addition to its normal mission of training for war, the army garrisoned the empire’s 
outposts and policed the home islands. Lacking a proper police force, the government 
depended on the army to aid in the suppression of smugglers, overawe rioters, and quell 
civil disturbances. These additional duties occupied the vast majority o f the soldiers’ time, 
leaving precious little for training. Furthermore, the army dispersed its regiments in small 
bodies (company-size or smaller) to cover as much territory as possible. Unit leaders 
trained their men in basic skills such as musket drill but could not conduct large-scale 
maneuver training. Rare was the occasion when two companies trained together; 
regimental training was unheard of. Unfortunately, “numbers . . . were an essential 
prerequisite for the satisfactory and realistic performance of the advanced intricacies of the 
firings and maneuvers.” To compound this problem, leaders relaxed discipline, especially 
overseas, for fear of large-scale desertion. In a letter to his father, Lieutenant Colonel
65 Sargent, History of an Expedition, 112; Lee McCardell, Ill-Starred General: Braddock o f the
James Wolfe, the future hero of Quebec, decried the poor quality o f peacetime soldiers. “I 
have but a very mean opinion of the Infantry in general. I know their discipline to be bad, 
and their valour precarious. They are easily put into disorder, and hard to recover out of 
it.” He further condemned the army’s leadership for its laxity, and he predicted dire 
consequences. “I am sorry to say that our method of training and instructing the troops is 
extreamly defective, and tends to no good end. We are lazy in time of peace . . .  It will
cost us very dear some time hence. I hope the day is at a distance, but I am afraid it will
„ »66  come.
From this dilapidated, under-trained army, the duke of Cumberland chose two of its 
worst regiments to accompany Braddock to America. Neither the Forty-fourth Foot, 
under Colonel Sir Peter Halket, nor the Forty-eighth Foot, led by Colonel Thomas Dunbar, 
had a good reputation. The Forty-fourth earned its notoriety at the battle o f Prestonpans in 
1745, where it withstood Charles Stuart’s Highlanders for all of five minutes. Both 
regiments served on police duty throughout Ireland and were far below their authorized 
wartime strength. Cumberland’s unwillingness to finance the campaign was his sole reason 
for selecting these regiments. As units on the Irish establishment, the Irish parliament, 
rather than its British counterpart, paid for their upkeep. Thus, “the bottom line . . . 
directed the front line.”67
Braddock filled out both regiments with drafts from other units in the British Isles 
and managed to increase their strength to five hundred men apiece, but not without a price.
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The British army routinely rounded out deploying regiments at the expense of those 
remaining behind, and losing units used this opportunity to rid themselves of troublemakers 
and fools. The drafts sent to the Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth were no exception.
Another four hundred colonials would join the regiments in America. This constant influx 
of strangers, poor soldiers, and raw recruits ruined whatever cohesiveness the regiments 
had and transformed them into “jumbled associations o f uneven quality.”68
As his final piece o f meddling in Braddock’s campaign, Cumberland determined the 
route to Fort Duquesne. He ordered Braddock to cut a road from Virginia to the Ohio 
rather than start from the more populous regions of Pennsylvania. A widely-circulated but 
inaccurate map by Lewis Evans, the famed cartographer, depicted the overland route via 
Virginia as shorter than the Pennsylvania alternative. Cumberland presumably considered 
this, but the powerful investors o f Virginia’s Ohio Company were the likely force behind 
the decision. Formed in 1749, the Ohio Company received a royal grant of five hundred 
thousand acres in the Ohio region. Its investors encouraged settlement in hopes of reaping 
large profits from land sales. A road, cut at military expense and capable of supporting 
heavy wagons, would ease the difficult passage to the area and presumably increase 
migration. Governor Dinwiddie, among the original investors, stood to gain considerably if 
the duke chose the Virginia plan. Another Ohio Company investor and wealthy London 
merchant, John Harbury, advised Cumberland to select Virginia. Harbury, who traded 
primarily in Virginia, stood to gain twofold.69
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Braddock and then his regiments finally sailed for Virginia, arriving in early 
February and mid-March 1755. The British forces gradually moved up the Potomac River 
and congregated at Fort Cumberland, a stockade constructed by colonial forces on a bluff 
overlooking the junction of Will’s Creek and the Potomac.70
Before sailing, Braddock had sent Lieutenant Colonel Sir John St. Clair ahead, 
royal instructions in hand, to supervise colonial preparations for the expedition. By royal 
decree, the king expected each colony to “raise . . .  as large a sum as . . . [could] be 
afforded as their contribution to a common Fund, to be employed . . . for the general 
Service in North America.” Furthermore, the instructions demanded that the colonies 
gather provisions, fodder, wagons, and horses, and recruit soldiers to fill out the Irish 
regiments. The general arrived expecting to find all in readiness for departure. Instead, he 
found a furious St. Clair and colonies more interested in trading with the French than in 
supplying the army. Governor Dinwiddie nearly accused the Middle Colonies of treason. 
“All the Provisions the French have for conducting this unjust Invasion of the Ohio is, as I 
am credibly informed, by a Supply from New York and Philadelphia.” Furthermore, 
Dinwiddie believed and reported rumors of the Albany merchants reverting to an old policy 
of neutrality with the Indians during war in order to assure uninterrupted trade.71
In addition to unscrupulous merchants, Braddock discovered the frustration of 
colonial politics. Each colony’s assembly continuously squabbled with its royal governor,
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and they viewed Braddock’s expedition as just another imposition by Whitehall. 
Pennsylvania’s opposition ran deeper than mere power politics. The Quaker-dominated 
assembly refused to finance a war fought by proxy and repeatedly sidestepped Governor 
Morris’s requests for men, material, and money. An exasperated Morris wrote to 
Braddock seeking his understanding. “You are sensible what a Sett o f People I have to 
deal with, who think self-defense a Crime, and Instead of advancing the Public Service do 
what they can to obstruct i t . . ..” He wrote the general again, apologizing for the behavior 
o f his assembly.
I am . . . almost ashamed to tell You that We have in this Province upward 
o f Three Hundred Thousand Inhabitants; that We are blessed with a rich 
Solid and temperate Climate, and besides our own Consumption raise 
Provisions enough to supply a Army of one Hundred Thousand Men . . .
We Are burthened with no Taxes and are not only out of Debt, but have a 
Revenue of Several Thousand a Year . . . And Yet when their all is invaded 
they refuse to contribute to the necessary Defense of their Country . . . .
Exaggerating the wealth of his province, Morris was not innocent in Pennsylvania’s
political games or failure to provide for Braddock, but the notorious Pennsylvania assembly
would continue to impede military actions in this manner for some time to come.72
Though lacking the moral objection of the Pennsylvanians, the legislative bodies of
Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas were equally recalcitrant. After continuous prodding
from Governor Dinwiddie, Virginia eventually provided provisions, raised several hundred
troops, and voted 20,000 pounds to support the Virginia soldiers. The others yielded far
less.73
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Despite last-minute material contributions, Braddock lacked the horses and wagons 
necessary to move his army’s artillery and supplies. To breach the formidable walls of Fort 
Duquesne, Braddock had brought a considerable train of artillery from Britain, including 
four twelve-pounder cannon, six six-pounders, four eight-inch howitzers, and fifteen 
cohoms.74 This ordinance, its ammunition, and general supplies for the army required 
hundreds o f wagons and thousands of draft animals to pull them. The lack of natural 
forage beyond Fort Cumberland required the army to bring its own, carried by even more 
wagons and animals. Early in the campaign, Governor Dinwiddie had pledged 200 wagons 
and 2,500 horses, but as late as June 8, Braddock griped that “the Number o f Horses and 
Waggons procur’d in these Colonies do not amount to the tenth part of what I was 
promis’d.”75
St. Clair, still fuming at the Quakers, threatened to march into Pennsylvania and 
“kill all kind of Cattle and carry away the Horses, bum the Houses,” and if delayed any
further, “he would with his Sword drawn pass thro’ the Province and treat the Inhabitants
/
as a Parcel of Traitors.” Fortunately, Benjamin Franklin intervened on behalf of General 
Braddock. Franklin preyed on the fears and memories of Pennsylvania’s German 
immigrants, who had suffered at the hands of warring armies in Europe. By coloring St. 
Clair as a Hussar, the infamous cavalrymen renowned throughout Europe for their pillaging 
and bmtality, Franklin obtained one hundred fifty wagons and over one thousand horses.76
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Braddock’s final hurdle to overcome was a lack of Indian auxiliaries. George 
Croghan, the Pennsylvanian Indian agent and trader, gathered fifty Mingo warriors and 
their families at Fort Cumberland. To secure their loyalty, if only temporarily, Braddock 
presented them with strings of wampum and a generous number of gifts, ordered his fifers 
and drummers to play, and fired several cannon, “which astonished and pleased the Indians 
greatly.” To Braddock’s ultimate misfortune, no other Indians joined him, and he would 
soon lose most o f what he had.77
Braddock’s critics blamed him for the lack of Indian support, claiming his rough 
demeanor and haughty, dismissive attitude angered the Indians. In fact, the fault lies with 
others. In the north, Britain’s traditional Indian allies, the Iroquois, chose neutrality despite 
the best efforts o f Sir William Johnson, an adopted Mohawk. French agents had 
successfully spread dissent among the Iroquois nations, especially the Seneca in the west. 
Furthermore, the Iroquois refused to work alongside southern Indians, among their 
traditional enemies, who were rumored to be joining the expedition.78
The southern Indians failed to appear due to intercolonial rivalry and petty feuding 
between two governors. Governor Dinwiddie appealed directly to the Cherokees and 
Catawbas of South Carolina, bypassing Governor James Glen. Besides irritation over his
y
violated jurisdiction, Glen saw in Dinwiddie’s missives an attempt to steal trade from his 
province. In response, he called a conference with the two nations in early June 1755, 
effectively drawing their services away. “I wish he had suspended their going to Him at 
this Time,” reflected Dinwiddie. He did not give up, though, and he sent Nathaniel Gist,
77 “Captain Orme’s Journal,” 309-310; “Morris Journal,” 329.
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son of Washington's guide to Fort Le Boeuf in 1753, to personally appeal for support.
Gist successfully convinced three hundred warriors to accompany him back to Virginia. En 
route, he encountered Richard Pearis, a South Carolina trader and bitter enemy of his 
father. Pearis convinced the Indians that a governor’s ambassador would posses a written 
commission and many gifts. Because Gist lacked both, the Indians refused to continue 
until they could “see some person of authority, upon whose promises they might rely.”79 
Back at Fort Cumberland, Braddock’s attempts to maintain discipline eroded his 
last Indian support. The Indian women were becoming “popular” with the soldiers, 
especially the officers, “who were scandalously fond of them.” Many soldiers stole rum 
and rations to trade for the women’s favors. To restore order, and in his mind to placate 
the Indians, Braddock first barred the women from entering the encampment and then 
ordered them home. Forty-two warriors left with their families, promising to rejoin 
Braddock on the march. They never did. When Braddock set out for Fort Duquesne, only 
eight warriors under the Oneida sachem Scarouady marched with him.80
Despite the lack of Indians, Braddock led a formidable army out of Fort 
Cumberland on June 7, 1755. The two regiments from Ireland, reinforced by several 
hundred colonial recruits, boasted seven hundred regulars each. Three independent 
companies of redcoats from New York and South Carolina tramped behind their brethren. 
Six hundred provincials, primarily Virginians, marched in eleven line companies, two
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companies o f pioneers and carpenters to clear a road, and a small troop of light horsemen. 
One hundred royal artillerymen from the Nova Scotia garrisons and thirty-five seamen 
borrowed from the royal navy came along to serve the artillery during the siege. Wagoners 
and drovers, including Daniel Boone and Daniel Morgan, managed the hundreds of wagons 
and packhorses. Numerous gentlemen volunteers from the colonies, such as George 
Washington acting as Braddock’s aide, accompanied the column, as did the normal pack of 
soldiers’ wives, sutlers, and the occasional prostitute. The long column stretched and 
contracted like a colorful snake, a gaudy red and blue stream among the dark hues of 
nature engulfing it.81
The army faced a daunting journey. Instead of the short march portrayed by 
Evans’s map, one hundred twenty miles of harsh wilderness, laced with swamps, rivers, 
lofty mountains, and impenetrable forests lay between the army and the French fort (fig. 6). 
St. Clair, responsible for constructing the road, complained bitterly. “It is certain that the 
ground is not easy to be reconnoitered for one may go twenty Miles without seeing before 
him ten yards . . . The Roads are either Rocky, or full of Boggs, we are obliged to blow the 
Rocks and lay Bridges every Day.” The pioneer companies slaved away under his 
direction, cutting a twelve-foot-wide road to accommodate the wagons and artillery. They 
hewed through ancient forests, blasted rocks, smoothed grades, and bridged rivers, 
creeping along at a snail’s pace. At the end o f some days, the tail o f the four-mile-long
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column barely reached where its head had been that morning. By the evening of June 17, 
the army encamped only twenty-four miles beyond Fort Cumberland.82
After receiving reports of French reinforcements moving toward the Ohio, and 
frustrated by the plodding pace o f his army, Braddock split his forces on June 8 and moved 
ahead with a “flying column.” He chose a cross section of the army, but in the words of a 
British soldier, “his Dependence was chiefly upon us Regulars that he brought from 
Ireland .” Selecting eight hundred regulars (excluding those raised in the colonies), four 
hundred provincials, the road crew, and the bulk of his artillery, the general pushed 
forward. Braddock left Colonel Dunbar behind with the worst troops, weakest animals, 
and most baggage to follow the advanced column as best he could.83
Despite Braddock’s intent, the “flying column” moved like a sick cow and its pace 
increased only marginally. Regardless of the general’s desire for speed, the artillery and 
wagons still required a passable road to be cut. Washington expressed his frustration in a 
letter home, complaining that “instead of pushing on with vigor, without regarding a Little 
rough Road, they were halting to Level every Mole Hill, and to erect Bridges over every 
brook; by which means we were 4 Days gettg 12 Miles.”84
Though slow, Braddock conducted his movement in a manner to please the strictest 
Prussian general, and the army maintained tight security. The infantry marched along each
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side of the wagons and guns. Each company pushed thirty men out as flankers, and these 
flanking parties pushed ten men out even further, effectively surrounding the column in 
three layers of soldiers. A vanguard of three hundred soldiers led the way and protected 
the road crew, and a rear guard followed to gather stragglers and discourage desertion (fig. 
7). The grenadier companies occupied hills or ridges that dominated the line o f march, and 
flankers scrambled through every thicket that might hide an Indian.85 At all halts, the 
soldiers faced outwards with bayonets fixed, and at least half remained ready for action. At 
night, the column closed up and slept in a formation similar to the march order. Pickets 
walked their posts around the perimeter, a reaction force stood at the ready, and an 
occasional patrol swept the dark woods.86
As Braddock’s army crawled closer to Fort Duquesne, signs of the enemy 
increased, and enemy scouts grew bolder. On June 24 and 26, British outriders discovered 
recently abandoned camps where French and Indian scouts had left their mark. “They had 
stripped and parted some trees,” wrote Captain Robert Orme, Braddock’s senior aide, 
“upon which they and the French had written all Kinds of scurrilous language,” mostly 
boasting of their intended actions. Other lurking Indians sniped at the column, “ fireing at 
our Wagoners fetching in their horses,” or, very rarely, shot and scalped an unwary 
straggler.87
The British regulars grew nervous at the prospect o f encountering an unknown 
enemy. Out o f spite and in a show of bravado, the colonial soldiers stoked this fear by
85 Traditionally, grenadiers were soldiers who threw grenades. In the 18th century, the British army 
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predicting that “if they attempted to fight Indians in a regular manner, they would certainly 
be defeated.” Soon the regulars were “terrified at the notion of having no Quarter and 
being scalped,” and of the “Barbaras Usage which we knew they would treat us.” Tense 
sentries at night fired at anything and nothing. Unprovoked shootings reached such a 
magnitude that Braddock threatened punishment for future violators. The anxiety 
exploded on July 6 during an Indian raid on the column, when wary provincials mistook the 
army’s own Indians for hostiles and killed Scarouady’s son.88
Nerves aside, Braddock continued to move with absolute precision, taking all 
necessary precautions to protect the army. On July 8, the column entered the narrow valley 
of Long Run, a likely ambush site. Braddock carefully posted troops along the ridges 
ringing the valley and set Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage to the far end of the valley with 
the grenadier companies. They found no sign of the enemy. Further on, the scouts 
reported, the army’s current path would cross a difficult ford and wind through the 
Narrows, a very dangerous passage. This route would require an inordinate amount of 
work to make the road passable and was a natural ambush site. Braddock opted to cross 
to the west side of the Monongahela River, bypass the Narrows, and recross the river 
upstream from Fort Duquesne. That night, the army bivouacked within two miles of the
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Monongahela River. Braddock planned to cross the river early the next morning, camp on 
the far side, and invest the fort on July 10.89
A scant ten miles away, the French commander, Captain Claude Pecaudy, sieur de 
Contrecoeur, heatedly argued with his reluctant Indian allies and prepared to meet the 
British onslaught. Less than two weeks before, in late June, Contrecoeur commanded 
under two hundred Frenchmen, Canadians, and Indians. Lacking sufficient forces to 
successfully defeat the British, he had planned to destroy the fort and retreat before the 
British arrived. He sent numerous scouting parties to harass the British, but they 
succeeded in killing only a few stragglers. The main body of the enemy army was too alert, 
impressing Contrecoeur with its tight security. They were “constantly on guard, always in 
a line of battle,” he reported, “so that all of the efforts of the detachments were to no 
avail.”90
On July 6, Captain Daniel Beaujeu arrived at Fort Duquesne with several hundred 
French and Canadian soldiers. Just days before, over eight hundred Indians, mostly from 
the upper Great Lakes, arrived with the metis Charles Langlade at their head. Beaujeu 
knew the Indians would be useless in a siege, and he urged Contrecoeur to adopt a more 
aggressive strategy. Contrecoeur finally decided to strike the English while on the march, 
but his steadfast Indian allies hesitated to attack because of inflated reports o f Braddock’s 
strength. “Father, you want to die and sacrifice us. The English are more than four 
thousand . . . Certainly you must see that you are making no sense.” Beaujeu, an
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experienced Indian negotiator, chastised the Indians for their fears, however justified. “I 
am determined to confront the enemy. What—would you let your father go alone? I am 
certain to defeat them!” Stung by the rebuke, the Indians agreed to go.91
James Smith, a young Pennsylvanian, watched the frantic preparation from within 
Fort Duquesne. Six weeks before, a group of Delaware Indians had captured him in 
western Pennsylvania. Severely beaten while running the gauntlet, Smith was recuperating 
in the French hospital in Duquesne in the tense days before the battle. He worriedly 
watched as the Indians scooped up handfuls of powder, shot, and flints from open casks. 
Curious, he spoke to a friendly Delaware who understood English. The Indian indicated 
that “Braddock’s army was advancing in very close order, and that the Indians would 
surround them, take trees, and (as he expressed it) shoot um down all one pigeon.” At 
mid-morning on July 9, 72 French regulars, 146 Canadians, and 637 Indians streamed out 
the gates and ran south, intent on ambushing the British as they crossed the 
Monongahela.92
By the time the French forces left Duquesne, Braddock’s army was fording the 
Monongahela eight miles away. Braddock was no fool. He knew that the river was the 
ideal place for ambush and therefore sent Gage and his strong vanguard to secure the far 
banks. Gage crossed the river unopposed and unlimbered two cannon to cover the ford. 
Braddock formed the remainder of his army into a line of battle for the crossing, still 
expecting trouble. With great pomp and ceremony, the army crossed “over the river in the
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greatest order, with their bayonets fixed, colors flying, and Drums and Fifes beating and 
playing, as He supposed the Enemy would take a view of them in their crossing.93
Once on the far side of the river, the army resumed its march. The scouts under 
George Croghan and a few horsemen led the way, followed by engineer Harry Gordon, 
who marked trees for the road crew to fell. Gage’s vanguard o f450 men, with its own 
advanced and flank parties, trailed close behind. St. Clair’s road crew o f 250 men and 
several tool wagons stretched for two hundred yards behind Gage. After a short break 
tramped the main body, led by the sailors and the general’s guard. Five hundred men, in 
twelve companies, marched along side the quarter-mile-long string of wagons and artillery. 
Sir Peter Halket and 120 soldiers, mostly Americans, brought up the rear. Hundreds of 
cattle and packhorses filled the gap between the flank parties and the main body (fig. 8).94
A feeling of euphoria washed over the entire mile-long column. The French had not 
attacked them at any likely place along their journey. Surely they would not do so now, 
many thought. Several officers expected the French to abandon Fort Duquesne and flee, 
and they anxiously awaited the sound of the fort exploding in the distance. “Every one . . . 
hugg’d themselves with joy at our Good Luck in having surmounted our greatest 
Difficultys,” wrote Harry Gordon, “and too hastily Concluded the Enemy wou’d dare to 
Oppose us.” “There Never was an Army in the World in more spirits then we where,” 
exclaimed Captain Robert Cholmley’s batman, “thinking of Reaching Fort de Cain the day 
following.” Confident in success, Gage sent his two cannon to the rear and exclaimed loud
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enough for his soldiers to hear, “I do not think we Shall have much Occation for them.” 
Without a thought o f danger, he marched by a large hill on his right, making no effort to 
reconnoiter or hold it as he had the day before.95
At one o’clock, the light-hearted British and the disorganized stream of French and 
Indians collided one mile beyond the ford. The American scouts spied the enemy first, and 
one “immediately discharged his piece . . . [and] cried, the Indiens was upon us.” Harry 
Gordon stopped blazing trees, rode forward and saw over three hundred Indians and a 
smattering of Frenchmen in native garb running toward him. Captain Beaujeu, stripped to 
the waist and sporting a gorget around his neck, led the boiling mass of warriors. Spying 
the British grenadiers in their tall miter caps, he waved his hat left and right, signaling his 
forces to split and run down the flanks of the British column. The grenadiers responded as 
trained soldiers should. Under Gage’s direction, they formed a line, fixed bayonets, and 
delivered a series of steady volleys that startled the French, caused several Canadians to 
flee, and killed Beaujeu.96
Captain Jean Dumas, Beaujeu’s second, took control, and his forces began pouring 
a devastating fire into the massed ranks of Gage’s men. The Indians shot down several 
British officers immediately, followed by a steady flow of regulars, and drove in the flank 
parties. “The Men dropped like Leaves in Autumn, and all was Confusion,” wrote a 
British officer in the front ranks. The formation disintegrated quickly and fell back onto St. 
Clair’s working party. Within the first fifteen minutes o f the battle, the vanguard and the
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road crew were hopelessly intermingled and taking heavy losses. The Indians and French 
arrayed themselves in a half-moon around most of the column and perched on the hill that 
Gage had ignored a short time before.97
With the first shots, Braddock reacted according to regulation. After halting the 
column, he sent an aide forward for news, but the aide never returned. In spite o f his 
ignorance of the situation, Braddock ordered Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Burton to move 
forward with four hundred soldiers to reinforce Gage. Separated by the wagons, the 
companies marched forward and formed in front of the baggage. The fire from the hilltop 
immediately took its toll on the scarlet ranks. Burton shifted direction and formed his men 
to assault the hill.98
While Burton formed, the tangled parties further up the line fell back again and 
smashed into his moving companies. The result was pandemonium. Companies and 
battalions became intermingled, men lost their places in formation, and officers lost their 
units. “Such was the confusion, that the men were sometimes 20 or 30 deep,” facing in all 
directions. The French and Indians were nearly invisible, presenting no targets for the 
British to shoot at. “If any got a shott at one the fire immediately ran through the whole 
line though they saw nothing but trees.” Soldiers in the middle o f the massed body leveled 
their muskets and fired into the backs o f their comrades.99
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The officers, frantically working to restore order, “advanced into the front, and 
soon became the mark of the Enemy, who scarce left one, that was not killed or wounded.” 
Burton organized a company and again attempted to storm the heights. When the Indians 
shot him down, his dismayed soldiers scampered back into the jumble on the road. 
Braddock, conspicuous on his horse, galloped everywhere, begging, pleading, encouraging, 
and threatening his men to form ranks and follow his lead. Though an obvious target for 
enemy marksmen, he remained unscathed. Braddock’s mounts bore the brunt o f shots 
directed at him, and four horses died under him in quick succession.100
Despite all efforts, the men refused to advance, afraid to leave the “safety” of the 
masses. “He thought himself securest who was in the Center.” Like automatons, the 
soldiers were lost when out of formation and lacking familiar leadership. A nearly invisible 
enemy continued to pour fire into the column and kept up a fierce din that terrified the 
men, including Lieutenant Matthew Leslie. “The yell of the Indians is fresh on my ear, and 
the terrific sound will haunt me until the hour of my dissolution.” An occasional warrior 
burst from the undergrowth to rip the bloody scalp from a slain soldier, but the redcoats 
saw very few of the enemy. The Forty-fourth’s chaplain later exclaimed that “ in all the 
Time I never saw one, nor could I on Enquiry find any one who saw ten together.” Thus 
men continued to load and fire, massacring a host of trees.101
Early in the fight, some of the colonial troops sought cover and temporarily kept 
the Indians at bay. A Virginia company drove the Indians away from a strong point,
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momentarily throwing them into confusion. Captain Cholmley’s batman, who witnessed 
their efforts, claimed that these “two hundred . . . American soldiers that fought behind 
Trees . . . did the moast Execution of Any.” Unfortunately, the Virginians were just as 
invisible to the British as the Indians. Seeing only flashes and gun smoke, the redcoats 
fired a devastating volley into the Virginian ranks, forcing them to return to the road.102
By four o ’clock, Braddock’s army was devestated. Over half of the officers and 
men lay dead or wounded, the remaining soldiers lacked ammunition, and the French were 
attempting to bring a captured cannon into action. While mounting his fifth horse, the 
charmed Braddock grunted as a bullet pierced his arm and lodged in his lungs. He 
staggered, fell, and finally ordered a retreat.103
Washington accompanied Braddock as the retreat turned into a headlong race for 
the river. The men “broke and run as Sheep persued by dogs,” the young man wrote. 
Several officers, including the wounded Burton tried to rally the troops on the far side of 
the Monongahela. “It was with as much success as if we had attempted to have stop’d the 
wild Bears of the Mountain.” Most men kept running through the night and most of the 
next day until they reached Dunbar’s column over fifty miles away.104
At Dunbar’s camp, the army counted its losses. Of 1,459 soldiers and attendants in 
the flying column, 914 were either dead or wounded, including 63 of 86 officers.
Unknown to the British, the French butcher bill amounted to fewer than 70 casualties.
Over four hundred horses, one hundred cattle, a month’s supply of food and ammunition,
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several thousand pounds in currency, and a fine train of artillery lay scattered in the woods. 
Most disturbing, other than the magnitude of human loss, was the capture o f Braddock’s 
personal papers, including detailed plans for all four operations o f the 1755 campaign.105
Mortally wounded and in despair, Braddock ordered a retreat to Fort Cumberland. 
With the majority o f his draft animals lost, he directed the destruction of anything that 
could not be carried. The general was in a state of disbelief, yet he had learned a valuable 
lesson. In a moment of clarity, he muttered, “We shall know better how to deal with them 
another time.”106
On July 13, Braddock died. Fearing desecration of his body by marauding Indians, 
Washington ordered the general buried in the middle of the road. As the survivors of the 
debacle march eastward, they tramped over his grave, obliterating all traces of its 
existence. Colonel Dunbar assumed command and marched the army into winter quarters 
(in mid-summer) in Philadelphia, leaving the Virginia/Pennsylvania frontier at the mercy of 
the enemy.107
Before Dunbar’s official dispatch could reach the various colonial governors, 
rumors and eyewitness accounts swirled across the frontier. Teamsters fleeing on their 
animals and swift-running soldiers reported a complete massacre. These stories changed 
with each telling until the truth was lost. The general mood was one of disbelief, expressed 
so eloquently by the dying Braddock. “Who would have thought it?” And who would
105 Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 128; Freeman, Washington Biography, 2:87; Kopperman, Braddock, 
90-91; “Relation Depuis,” Sargent, History o f an Expedition, 411-12.
106 “Morris Journal,” 388; “Cholmley’s Batman,” 32; “Captain Orme’s Journal,” 357; Thomas Dunbar to 
Robert Napier, Fort Cumberland, 24 July 1755, Military Affairs, 110; Sargent, History o f an Expedition, 
237.
107 “Morris Journal,” 388; Sargent, History o f an Expedition, 261; “Cholmley’s Batman,” 32; Dunbar to 
Napier, Military Affairs, 111.
66
have? The most powerful British army in North America, fully supplied, heavily armed, 
capably lead, and utterly crushed. People of all stripes sought a scapegoat. Politicians and 
soldiers immediately hurled accusations and countercharges at one another. The British 
officers blamed “that poor dumb ox, the British private soldier,” Americans criticized the 
British, and the regulars, at the bottom of the dung heap, blamed the Americans. The duke 
of Cumberland received harsh censure for devising the campaign, falling prey to the Ohio 
Company and selecting the Virginia route, and for choosing Braddock. And, o f course, 
everyone universally condemned the dead general.108
The debate over the causes of Braddock’s defeat began in the months following the 
battle and continues to rage today. Explanations and theories abound, many valid, but 
many based on fictional or second-hand information. The varied criticisms fall into 
traditional or modern interpretations.
The traditional American explanation held Braddock completely at fault, claiming 
he was “too rigid, too narrow, too Prussianic.” Benjamin Franklin, and the nineteenth- 
century historians Francis Parkman and Winthrop Sargent, typify this viewpoint. The first 
of their three major criticisms attacked Braddock’s apparent dependence on regular troops 
and overconfidence in close-order tactics. “He had too much self-confidence, too high an 
opinion of the validity of regular troops,” wrote Franklin, “and too mean a one of both 
Americans and Indians.” Braddock disdained the capabilities of Indians and irregular 
forces and was completely ignorant of them, the traditionalists claimed. When Franklin 
reportedly warned the general of Indian ferocity, he haughtily replied, “These savages may,
108 Pargellis, “Braddock’s Defeat,” American Historical Review 41 (1935): 267; Kopperman, Braddock, 
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indeed, be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia, but upon the King’s regulars 
and disciplin’d troops, Sir, it is impossible they should make any impression.”109
Braddock was certainly confident, but he was not ignorant o f irregular tactics and 
forces. Although his one and only experience in combat ended in abject failure, Braddock 
had most certainly learned of such fighting through his comrades and popular and 
professional literature. His career spanned a time period of heightened interest in, use of, 
and publication on irregular forces. While his personal library is a mystery, the sheer 
volume of material on the subject of la petite guerre made his exposure to it almost 
certain.110
But having knowledge of such tactics did not make them an option for Braddock. 
Bush fighting demanded initiative and discipline from the lowliest private, all performed in 
an extended formation with little officer control. Teaching soldiers to fight in this manner 
required considerably more time than training for close-order drill. Braddock’s troops, 
new to each other and to the army and of questionable quality, could barely march in 
formation, and the general rightly dedicated the short time available to basic maneuver.
The soldiers panicked when under the close supervision of officers. Their performance 
unsupervised would certainly have been worse.111
The traditionalists’ second charge claimed that Braddock’s contemptuous treatment 
of Indians lost their support. Though not a charmer, Braddock always treated Indians with 
respect. To do otherwise would violate the king’s orders, which clearly stated “You w ill. .
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. cultivate the best Harmony and Friendship possible . . . with the Chiefs of the Indian 
Tribes.” As with all orders, Braddock took this seriously and held several conferences, 
plying the Indians with gifts and honoring them with artillery salutes. He even took a 
wagonload of gifts with his flying column. His justifiable attempts at discipline at Fort 
Cumberland may have lost him forty Indians, but the feuding of Governors Dinwiddie and 
Glen, and William Johnson’s failure to gain Iroquois support cost Braddock hundreds.112
The final indictment leveled by American traditionalists claimed that Braddock 
ignored the advice o f his subordinates. Specifically, he ignored advice to bring up 
Dunbar’s column before attacking the fort, and he refused to allow the provincials to fight 
Indian style. This charge was unfounded. Braddock held several councils o f war before 
and during the march and actively sought the advice of his juniors. He ignored both pieces 
of advice for good reason. Dunbar’s column, with the weakest animals, lay sixty miles 
away. At his pace, he would have arrived at the Monongahela in late July or early August, 
nullifying the purpose of the flying column. He also led the worst troops, intentionally left 
behind by Braddock. If  Braddock’s best troops panicked and failed, it is doubtful that 
Dunbar’s dregs would have tipped the scale.113
The argument regarding bush fighting is largely a legend built around the figure of 
Washington. Billy Brown, a ninety-three-year-old slave, recalled his participation in the 
expedition in 1830. He described Washington on his knees in the midst of battle, begging 
Braddock for permission to lead the Virginians into the trees. Braddock supposedly 
“cursed him, and said, T’ve a mind to run you through the body . . . we’ll sup to-day in
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Fort Du Quesne, or else in hell!” Dramatic, yes, but Washington never recounted this 
anecdote, and Brown’s testimony is hardly credible. The officer he claimed to have served 
did not exist. Brown also neatly inserted himself at General Wolfe’s side at his death at 
Quebec in 1759. Perhaps the clouds of age or the desire for notoriety blended fact and 
fiction in his memory. Regardless, the provincials who sought the cover of the trees were 
not frontiersmen or even backwoods settlers. Most hailed from the tidewater o f Virginia 
and Maryland and “turned out to be mostly plowboys and drifters, younger sons and recent 
immigrants who had never spent a night in the woods.” Many of these provincials were 
veterans o f Washington’s fight at Fort Necessity, where instead of scattering into a loose 
formation in the woods, they retreated to a fortified stockade (a conventional response), 
indicating a lack of familiarity with or confusion over irregular warfare. The following year 
spent at Fort Cumberland before Braddock’s expedition had done little to improve their 
lack of frontier savvy. Furthermore, for these men to take cover behind trees would only 
have provided temporary shelter. The Indians did not shelter behind a single tree during a 
fight, but continued to fire and move, constantly seeking new positions. The mobile 
Indians could easily flank and shoot a stationary soldier. Only with accurate musket fire 
could the British hope to drive off the Indians, and the casualty figures from the battle 
clearly demonstrate the redcoats’ and provincials’ lack of marksmanship. For Braddock’s 
army to “go to tree” would only have postponed the defeat.114
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The traditional British view disregarded any elements proposed by the Americans 
and focused instead on the soldiers. Unable or unwilling to sully the reputations o f the 
vaunted officer corps (or trying to regain their reputations after the battle), this group of 
critics blamed the “rabble’s” cowardice and panic for the defeat, while claiming that every 
officer behaved bravely. This view is correct to a degree. The men did panic and the 
officers were brave, but the failures of certain officers, far beyond the control o f simple 
soldiers, led to the panic, not some innate inferiority on the soldiers’ part. The redcoats 
stood up under punishing fire for over three hours, suffering horribly. This alone indicates 
a measure of bravery.115
The first interpretation of Braddock’s defeat to depart from these traditional 
theories came with Stanley Pargellis in 1936. Disregarding previous hypotheses, Pargellis 
focused on Braddock’s tactics and blamed the defeat on “incompetent leadership, judged 
not by modem standards, but by contemporary.” Pargellis leveled three charges at 
Braddock: he used improper formations, he failed to react properly, and he failed to 
occupy the hill on the right flank of the column. The first charge, based on an inexact 
sketch and a second-hand report, claimed that the wagon train split each infantry company, 
leaving all of the officers on one side and preventing the unit from acting collectively. In 
his rush to judgement, Pargellis ignored the proper formations indicated on Captain Robert 
Orme’s map. Furthermore, Braddock’s personal order on March 27 directed each
115 Yaples, “A Reconsideration,” 197-98.
71
“Company . . .  to te ll . . . off in two divisions . . . and post the second Commissioned Offr 
and nonCommssd Offrs,” meaning an officer and sergeant were always with their troops.116
Pargellis’s last two indictments were logical and correct. He based his evaluation 
on A Treatise o f Military Discipline by Lieutenant Colonel Humphrey Bland, a veteran of 
many campaigns with the British army. Bland first published the Treatise in 1727, and it 
grew so popular within military circles that it went through nine editions in Europe and 
several in America. The British army adopted Bland’s book and incorporated it into its 
1728 Regulations.117
Bland gave standard precautions for marching through wooded country while 
expecting an attack. He recommended establishing a vanguard, rear guard, and “small 
Parties, commanded by seijeants, marching on the Flanks of the Battalion.” Braddock did 
each of these correctly. However, Bland directed the vanguard to reconnoiter “every Place 
where any Number of Men can be conceal’d, such as Woods, Copses, Ditches.” The 
vanguard did this regularly until Gage ignored the critical hill after crossing the 
Monongahela.118
When the vanguard encountered the enemy, Bland continued, its leader was to send 
information back to the main body commander immediately. The commander, with no 
knowledge of the situation, would halt and wait for this report before deploying his men.
“It is impossible to say in what manner . . . [the commander] is to act when he meets with 
the enemy, without knowing their numbers, quality, and disposition.” Braddock sent an
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aide forward at the first gun, but receiving no reply, he blindly ordered Burton’s 
detachment forward. Thus, Braddock violated two important rules, earning himself 
condemnation by the very book he subscribed to. “If he is surpriz’d by neglecting common 
Methods used to prevent it, his Character is hardly Retrievable.”119
Robert Yaples, writing in 1968, agreed with Pargellis’s tactical analysis, but pushed 
the blame further down the chain of command. Two faults that Pargellis attributed to 
Braddock involved the vanguard: failure to take the hill and failure to advise the 
commander o f the situation. As the overall commander, Braddock was still responsible, 
but Gage, as commander of the vanguard, failed in his duties. Furthermore, the vanguard’s 
purpose was to stand and absorb the first shock of attack and allow the commander and the 
main body time to deploy. Gage’s force disintegrated quickly and fell back, causing 
immense confusion. Overall, Yaples argued, the British simply had bad luck. The 
combination of a chance encounter, Gage’s ineptitude, and terrain favorable to the enemy 
led to defeat.120
Paul Kopperman sought to end the debate in 1977 with the most comprehensive 
examination of the battle to date. After considering all factors, he concluded, like the 
British traditionalists, that the soldiers’ panic caused defeat. Even though Braddock and 
his officers made mistakes, they did not lead their men into an impossible situation, 
Kopperman argued. Any attempt to react “required a sizable body o f men to succeed,” 
and the soldiers failed to answer the call. “The weight of the evidence places the onus on
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them.” The army could have survived intact, Kopperman claimed “if they had kept their 
heads.” A disciplined counterattack, using the bayonet, would have won the day.121
Kopperman was correct that panic among the men contributed to the defeat, but a 
quick bayonet charge would not have necessarily saved the British. The success o f a 
bayonet charge depended on an undisciplined or unorganized enemy, easily swept aside by 
the threat o f  cold steel in the belly. Leroy Eid argued that Indian warriors were highly 
disciplined and organized. Many tribes operated in large numbers and used complicated 
formations and maneuvers for warfare and communal hunting long before extensive 
European influence. In 1606, the Frenchman Marc Lescarbot accompanied over one 
thousand Algonquin warriors on a campaign against the Iroquois. “They practice 
maneuvers, appear on schedule, march on order, and approach the enemy in clearly defined 
unity,” he noted in a letter. James Smith, the young Pennsylvania prisoner at Fort 
Duquesne, witnessed similar actions during his lengthy captivity. “Indians were punctual in 
obeying orders, they acted in concert, and they cheerfully and immediately carried out 
direction.”122
The Indians’ typical formation was a half-moon or horseshoe, which allowed 
maximum flexibility and coverage, yet prevented heavy casualties. Rather than strike an 
enemy head on, the Indians moved from tree to tree, working around their opponents’ 
flanks until nearly surrounding them. Several of Braddock’s soldiers, such as Harry 
Gordon and Captain Cholmley’s batman, both accurately described the technique. “They 
Divided themselves and Run along our right and Left flanks . . . and fell upon the flank 
partys,” described Gordon. Cholmley’s batman seemed to understand the intent.
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“Immediately they began to Ingage us in a half Moon and still Continued Surrounding us 
more and more.”123
Once holding the enemy in this strangle hold, the Indians maintained “a kind of 
Running fight, Skulking behind Trees and Bushes,” always in motion. In a method Eid 
labeled “blackbirding,” the Indians advanced or gave up ground as the battle progressed. 
Small groups of warriors worked together, some moving while their companions fired. If 
an enemy pressed hard, such as Kopperman’s suggested bayonet charge, the Indians simply 
retreated until the assault was over, then advanced again. Francis Parkman saw the futility 
of such an attack. “To charge the Indians in their hiding-place would have been useless. 
They would have eluded pursuit with the agility of wildcats, and swarmed back, like angry 
hornets, the moment that it ceased.”124
Each theory, whether traditional or modern, contains elements of the truth behind 
the expedition’s tragic conclusion. Four primary reasons emerge by combining the valid 
portions of each argument. First, the several months’ delay allowed this chance encounter 
to happen. The duke of Cumberland’s misguided selection of the Virginia route led to an 
extremely slow advance and difficulty in obtaining supplies. The ineptitude and 
disinterestedness o f the colonial governments and merchants delayed the gathering of 
supplies and transportation assets. If  Braddock had marched when he intended (in April), 
or even a few weeks before he did, he would have beaten Beaujeu, his reinforcements, and 
the Great Lakes Indians to Fort Duquesne. Beaujeu was the instigator o f the attack, and it
122 Eid, “A Running Fight,” 149-152.
123 Ibid., 155-164; Pargellis, “Braddock’s Defeat,” 106; “Cholmley’s Batman,” 28.
124 Eid, “A Running Fight,” 155-58; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 127.
75
was he who motivated the Indians. Without his crucial leadership, Contrecoeur would 
have destroyed his post and retreated.
The lack of Indian support hurt Braddock severely. Lacking a sizable 
reconnaissance force, Braddock marched almost blindly into the wilderness. His few scouts 
could cover only a short distance in front of the column and often refused to venture 
further. As noted before, the blame for this is widespread. Intercolonial rivalry, personal 
vendettas, Indian politics, Braddock’s discipline, and French influence all assured the 
British a paucity of support.
Third, the absolute panic of the regulars prevented any decisive action on 
Braddock’s part. Whether because of colonial “ghost stories,” lack of unit cohesion and 
training, or the quick destruction of the leadership, the soldiers refused to respond to 
direction. They clumped together in a massive red target, unwilling to aggressively attack 
the invisible force tormenting them, yet strangely willing to stand in place and absorb the 
horrific fire.
Finally, tactical errors by the British officers left the army vulnerable to defeat. 
Braddock marched over one hundred miles from his last base without constructing an 
intermediate base or magazine in between, forcing him to gamble everything on 
successfully taking Fort Duquesne, or else risking a long retreat through hostile territory 
following defeat. Gage’s momentary lapse of judgment left a dominating hill unoccupied, 
unlike previous days. His inability to hold his command together, his failure to inform 
Braddock, and the general’s rush to the front, resulted in chaos. Until that unfortunate 
moment, European tactics had proved applicable and remarkably successful in the 
backcountry. While recovering from his wounds in the days following the battle, Harry
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Gordon lamented the simple errors of July 9. “Had our March Been Executed in the same 
manner on the 9th as it was on the 8th, I should have stood a fair Chance of writing from 
fort Du Quesne, instead o f Being in the hospital at Wills’s Creek.”125
Beyond the tactical causes of Braddock’s defeat, the practical consequences 
became immediately apparent. The French gained a temporary respite and remained in 
possession of Fort Duquesne until 1758. The capture of Braddock’s papers was a 
miraculous boon, allowing the French to make adjustments to counter the other thrusts of 
the British campaign. Furthermore, the papers allowed France to portray itself to the 
European community as a victim of British aggression. The Canadian governor believed 
that the plans provided the “most authentic proof of extensive plans, for long the principal 
occupation of the court of Great Britain, to surprise this colony and invade it at a time 
when, on the faith of the most respectable treaties of peace, it should be safe from any 
insult.” In a letter to his royal “cousin” of Britain, Louis XV complained of British 
duplicity, offering peace with one hand while preparing for war with the other. “It is 
scarce possible to conceive how these assurances can be reconciled with the orders for 
hostilities given . . .  to General Braddock.” Such actions constituted “a public insult to his 
Majesty’s flag.” In a letter o f reply, the British ministry countered Louis’s claims with 
counter-accusations of its own. The Ohio Valley belonged to Britain, contended the 
ministry, based on the Treaties o f Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle, both of which called for the 
realignment of lands in America to  “the same footing that they were, or ought to have 
been, before the last war.” In fact, continued the British reply, France was the aggressor in 
America. But Louis had drawn “a veil over all the hostilities committed on [his] part in
125 Gordon to —, Military Affairs, 107.
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America,” including an “invasion” of Nova Scotia, harassment o f British subjects 
(American traders and Anglo-aligned Indians) in the Ohio Valley, and the erection “with an 
armed force, a chain of forts on the lands” claimed by Virginia. “Worn out by the 
continuance of these violences,” King George “found himself obliged to provide for the 
security and defense of his subjects.” There was nothing irreconcilable between Britain’s 
peace overtures and Braddock’s actions, the letter concluded. On the contrary, France’s 
hostile actions justified the British “response.” “It can never be unlawful to repel an 
aggressor.”126
The citizenry of Britain called for vengeance against their traditional enemy, who 
had so brazenly violated the rules o f “civil” warfare by employing “savages” in an ambush. 
Lieutenant Matthew Leslie, St. Clair’s assistant, expressed the common sentiment clearly in 
a letter to a Philadelphia merchant. “We have lost gallant officers and generous friends, not 
in battle, for that we could bear, but by murder, by savage butchery. The French dared not 
openly meet us; our’s is the loss, theirs the disgrace.” Later in the war, Britain would not 
hesitate to use Indians or their “dastardly” tactics in the same way. Rather than genuine 
astonishment, Leslie’s diatribe indicated an attempt by Britain to label the supposedly 
civilized French as “savages.” Thus, each side used the battle’s outcome as propaganda to 
justify an end to the political cat-and-mouse game and openly declare war.127
Beyond the sparring in the political arena, Braddock’s defeat had other far-reaching 
consequences. Soon the frontier would erupt as French and Indian raiders swooped down
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on the nearly undefended border settlements from Virginia to Pennsylvania. Political 
haggling in the provincial governments would prevent a unified and efficient response on 
the part of the colonies. Settlers fled eastward in droves, while hysterical preachers 
predicted the fiery end of the colonies. In the midst o f this turmoil, American colonists 
began to question their ties with Britain. The home country was unable to protect its own 
troops from a “small” band of “savages,” let alone defend the entirety of the North 
American colonies, and as doubts arose over Britain’s invincibility, the first vestiges of an 
American identity began to emerge.
I l l
AFTERMATH OF DISASTER: THE RESPONSE TO BRADDOCK’S DEFEAT
This will be the most melancholy and calamitous Year that Virginia 
has ever seen; and he is a stupid Creature indeed, that can flatter 
himself with better Hopes.
Samuel Davies, 1755
On July 20, 1755, the broken, dispirited remnants of General Edward Braddock’s 
army trudged through the palisades of Fort Cumberland, Maryland. Of the nearly twenty- 
six hundred soldiers and sailors who had marched from the fort in May to destroy Fort 
Duquesne at the Forks of the Ohio, over four hundred lay dead along the banks of the 
Monongahela River or strewn along the army’s line of retreat, including the general 
himself. The remains of the army under Colonel Thomas Dunbar were still formidable in 
numbers, but they possessed little of the snap that characterized their step only two months 
before. Once-crisp scarlet uniforms were stained with sweat and dirt, and muskets were 
caked with powder residue. Many soldiers had discarded weapons and equipment in 
efforts to flee from real and imagined pursuers. The following morning, nearly four 
hundred wounded soldiers limped into camp or rode in litters pulled by horses “so much 
fatiegued that we dread their performance.” Braddock’s ill-fated expedition was over.128
Beyond the physical reduction of Braddock’s army, the defeat on the Monongahela 
sparked a wide range of reactions among government officials, the clergy, minority
128 “The Morris Journal,” 389; George Washington to James Innnes, Little Meadows, Maryland, 17 July 
1755, Washington Papers, 1:344; Robert Dinwiddie to Thomas Dunbar, Williamsburg, 26 July 1755, 
Dinwiddie Papers, 1: 118-20; Leach, Arms for Empire 366-67.
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elements o f society, and private citizens. While the various colonial governors hoped for a 
quick counterattack by Colonel Dunbar, they soon reverted to internal means to cope with 
the loss. Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia enhanced his militia’s strength, bolstered frontier 
defenses, and appealed to the mercy of God, while Robert Morris o f Pennsylvania 
squabbled with his assembly over procedural minutia and the rights of the proprietor. 
Clergymen such as Samuel Davies quickly took the defeat as a sign from God and 
vigorously called for repentance and reform, while slaves and Catholics harbored hopes for 
ultimate French victory. Finally, large numbers of colonists began doubting the myth of 
British invincibility and began thinking of themselves as Americans rather than Englishmen. 
The schism with Britain was still twenty years away, but the roots o f independence and 
American identity began to build in the midst of Britain’s greatest war for empire.
While Braddock’s defeat was a major setback for the British effort to retake the 
Ohio Valley, final French victory was not a certainty. Colonel Dunbar remained at Fort 
Cumberland with nearly 1,600 soldiers, who with a period of rest and refitting could 
counter any French thrust down Braddock’s road. One officer in the column claimed that 
the army was “still the finest ever seen in America.” With four months of good weather 
remaining in the year, sizable reserves of food and munitions, and great numerical 
superiority over the French, a counterattack was possible. However, Dunbar harbored no 
illusions of grandeur or desire for notoriety, nor did he have any intention of marching west 
again or even of remaining on the frontier. Rumors of his impending departure spread 
faster than official dispatches, causing consternation among the backcountry settlers. 
Governor Morris o f Pennsylvania feared that Dunbar’s departure would not only leave the
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frontier undefended but also cause widespread panic and flight to the east. “The Removal 
of the Army from the Frontiers will leave the back Settlements entirely exposed to the 
Incursions of the French and Indians, who are flushed by their Late Victory, and will be 
encouraged by the Retreat o f the Forces . . . The People being defenseless will immediately 
quit their Habitation.” Besides a power vacuum in the West, Governor Dinwiddie of 
Virginia feared that French and Indian raiding parties would “come over the Mountains and 
rob and murder our People.” Not a man to dwell on fear, Dinwiddie proposed immediate 
action. Writing to Governor William Shirley, the new commander-in-chief o f British forces 
following Braddock’s death, Dinwiddie urged Shirley to send Dunbar against Fort 
Duquesne as quickly as possible in order “to retrieve our Loss.”129
But British commanders and politicians seemed more concerned with placing blame 
for the defeat and punishing malefactors than repairing morale and attacking again. “Great 
dishonour has been reflected on the British army” wrote Charles Chauncy, an influential 
Congregational minister from Boston, and its leaders were “pleased to lay the blame on the 
soldiers,; speaking of them as cowards, and as leaving their officers to fall a sacrifice to the 
enemy.” Sir Thomas Robinson, the British secretary of state, proposed harsh terms to 
“rehabilitate” Dunbar’s men and urged the colonel to “make as many examples of the most 
notorious delinquents as shall be found requisite and expedient to restore the Discipline.” 
He further threatened to cut off veteran’s benefits at Chelsea Hospital for any shirkers. 
Dunbar unknowingly acted on this advice before receiving it and generously applied the 
lash to his soldiers’ backs. Duncan Cameron, a veteran redcoat, claimed never to have
129 Leach, Arms for Empire, 127-28; MPCP, 6:502; Robert Dinwiddie to William Shirley, Williamsburg, 
29 July 1755, Shirley Correspondence, 2:211-12; Dinwiddie to George Washington, [Williamsburg], 26 
July 1755, Washington Papers, 1:344.
82
seen worse punishments. “Here was Court-Martial, upon Court-Martial, and the most 
cruel Whippings succeeded them as ever I beheld.”130
Shirley heeded the advice o f the various governors and ordered Dunbar to march 
on Fort Duquesne with all dispatch. However, he allowed Dunbar to refrain from 
attacking if “it shall become absolutely Impracticable.” Granted official sanction to retreat 
and with his mind already made up, Dunbar quickly marched his army to Philadelphia. 
Benjamin Franklin derided Dunbar for this overzealous charge to the rear. “He continued 
his hasty march through all the country, not thinking himself safe till he arrived at 
Philadelphia, where the inhabitants could protect him.”131
Dunbar’s decision was unfortunate for the British. Soon after the battle on the 
Monongahela, the French withdrew a number of troops from Fort Duquesne and sent them 
to reinforce other threatened posts. The bulk of the Great Lakes Indians, the true victors 
at the Monongahela, left shortly afterward as well. They had taken numerous scalps and 
several prisoners and thus satisfied set off for their homes. Pierre Pecaudy, sieur de 
Contrecour, the commander of Fort Duquesne, admitted that if the British had returned 
and attacked again, he would have been “seriously embarrassed.”132
The various tribes of the Ohio soon made up for the departure of the Great Lakes 
Indians. Throughout Braddock’s campaign, the Ohio Indians had remained neutral, hoping 
for the British to drive the French out of their lands but unwilling to commit to either side.
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Braddock’s virtual annihilation left little doubt over which European power would triumph 
and “gave the French [,] who remained Masters of all that part of the Country, an 
opportunity to strengthen and increase their Indian Interest and Influence . . . They won 
over several o f these Indians, who were before in our Interest, and some who held 
themselves . . . neutral.”133
Numerous raiding parties of Indians and Frenchmen fell on the undefended farms 
and isolated hamlets along the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia borderlands, burning 
homes and either killing the inhabitants or carrying them into captivity. The killings 
reached such magnitude that Captain Dumas at Fort Duquesne complained that for eight 
days he could do nothing else but pay scalp bounties. The settlers along the frontier 
seemed helpless before the onslaught of raiders even though the war parties were relatively 
small. Dinwiddie chastised Colonel David Stewart o f the Virginia militia for his county’s 
apparent unwillingness to confront the raiders. “It appears to me that Your People sit 
quiet under [attack] with’t rising in proper Bodies to defeat their Designs,” as if the people 
were “siez’d with a Panick.”134
Devastating raids continued throughout the summer and fall of 1755. On October 
16, Indians destroyed Mahanahy Creek in the Susquehanna River Valley, killing or 
capturing twenty-five people. Two weeks later, half o f the population of Great Cove, 
Virginia died under the hatchet. Similar attacks devastated English settlements throughout
133Sir William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, Fort Johnson, 28 May 1756, NYCD, 7:86; McConnell, A 
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the Shenandoah Valley, and war parties penetrated to within fifty miles o f Philadelphia, 
twelve miles o f Winchester, Virginia, and sixty-five miles of Boston. The overwhelmed 
commander o f Fort Cumberland, Adam Stephen, wrote despondently to George 
Washington. The raiders “go about and commit their outrages at all hours o f the day, and 
nothing is to be seen or heard of, but desolation and murder heightened with all barbarous 
circumstances, and unheard of instances of cruelty . . . The smoke of the burning 
plantations darkens the day and hides the neighboring mountains from our site.”135
Facing imminent death, frontier settlers fled in droves to the relative safety of the 
East, leaving large areas of western Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia empty of white 
settlers. Governor Horatio Sharpe of Maryland reported in September 1755 that “the 
Country is entirely deserted for 30 Miles below Fort Cumberland.” Six weeks later, the 
London Public Advertiser extended the abandoned zone to seventy-five miles. Finally, 
Daniel Dulany of Maryland claimed that “all the plantations in this Province (except two or 
three) for near one hundred miles to the Eastward of Fort Cumberland have been 
destroyed, or deserted.”136
Dinwiddie reported a similar exodus in Virginia, and flight reached such 
proportions that Washington, as commander of the Virginia regiment, published an 
advertisement in Winchester in October urging settlers to remain in their homes. “I can 
venture to assure them, that in a short time, the Frontier will be so well Guarded, that no 
mischief can be done, either to them or their Plantations.” This did little to stem the tide,
135 Alberts, Adventures ofStoboy 150-51; Adam Stephen to Washington, Winchester, 4 October 1755, 
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and Adam Stephen warned that “unless Relief is Sent to the Back inhabitants immediately 
None will Stay on this Side Monocasy or Winchester.”137
Despite Washington’s assurances, Indian and French raids continued without 
respite. With colonial forces posing no credible threat, raiding parties attacked to the very 
gates of Fort Cumberland, where two Indians captured a boy “within Musket Shot o f the 
Sentry.” Another party accosted Stephen immediately outside the gates, and he “Savd 
[his] Bacon by retreating to the Fort.” Stephen, like all military commanders on the 
frontier, was plainly frustrated by his inability to defend himself, let alone his district. “It 
Sits heavy upon me, to be obliged to let the Enemy pass under our Noses without even
putting them in bodily Fear. This increases Their Insolence, and adds to the Contemptible
\
Opinion The Indians have of us.”138
The colonial governments did not sit idly as their constituents died. However, their 
responses varied from quick funding and recruitment in Virginia to wholesale debate and 
deadlock within the Pennsylvania assembly. New York and New England, with the bulk of 
their troops and efforts focused on Crown Point, Fort Niagara, and Fort Beausejour, could 
send little aid to their brethren to the south. Both the New York and New Jersey 
assemblies increased funding and manpower levies in response to the Indian attacks, but
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they directed these resources toward the northern missions. Thus, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
and Virginia were left to deal with the frontier situation as best they could.139
After the initial shock of defeat and period of unity, the Pennsylvania government 
quickly reverted to its cycle of contention between the governor, representing the 
proprietor’s interests, and the Quaker-dominated assembly. Governor Morris insisted that 
the assembly take quick action to “prepare for our own Defense.” The assembly could 
hardly disagree with the need to act, but how to respond was another matter entirely. The 
assembly and the city council of Philadelphia consistently answered the governor’s 
proposals with polite refusal, while the governor staunchly protected his prerogative and 
interests against incursions by the assembly. When Morris requested the city council to 
provide quarters for Dunbar’s army, the mayor and aldermen refused. “We know of no 
law that Authorizes us to make such provisions, and, therefore, have it not in our powers 
to Obey your Order.” On another occasion, the governor requested funds for gifts to 
cement alliances with the few Indian nations still friendly to the British. As expected, the 
assembly refused. “As our Treasury is exhausted by the very heavy charges for the King’s 
Service, these Indians are come among us at a very unfortunate time when it is not in our 
power to supply them.” The assembly instead “suggested” that the proprietor, “whose 
interest is at least as much concerned as ours,” assume the expense.140
The Philadelphia council’s refusal to quarter troops and the assembly’s convenient 
“inability” to fund Indian gifts were both symptomatic of a much deeper schism between 
the assembly and the governor. Each jealously guarded its powers and constantly sought 
to limit those of the opponent. While both the assembly and the governor allegedly had the
139 Shirley to Robinson, Shirley Correspondence, 2:219.
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people’s best interest in mind, the petty power feud between them overshadowed any 
desire to act decisively or unite. Furthermore, the governor was intimately attached to the 
proprietor, whose influence and near immunity from assembly actions angered many 
Pennsylvanians. Such antagonism between key portions of government was difficult to 
overcome, even in the midst of emergency. In fact, in a continuation of the power 
struggle, the Quakers in the assembly quickly blamed the governor for the Indian attacks. 
Believing that their fair treatment of Indians had kept the peace for years, the Friends in the 
legislature declared that non-Quaker violence and provocation had sparked the war. 
Because they dominated the assembly, the Quakers assumed that the people would shift 
blame for the war and government inaction from the assembly to the governor’s council.141
Beyond mere jealousy and rivalry, the assembly vehemently opposed the 
proprietor’s immunity from tax bills passed by the colonial government. Soon after 
Braddock’s defeat, the assembly passed a bill granting £50,000 for “the King’s use,” to be 
raised in part by taxing all estates, real and personal, in the colony. Governor Morris 
immediately claimed exemption for the proprietor and demanded another spending bill.
The assembly refused to change its stance, as did the governor. Exasperated, Morris 
attempted to shame the assembly into conforming to his wishes. “Had you really any 
tenderness for your bleeding country would you have acted the part you have done? . . .  or 
would you now . . . waste your time in disputing about new and extraordinary Claims of 
your own raising when every head and hand should be employed for the public Safety.”142
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If  Morris hoped to spur the assembly into action, he was sadly mistaken. Stung by 
the governor’s claims of indifference, the assembly hardened its stance and responded with 
a lengthy and heated letter, outlining its objections to proprietary exemption. Discounting 
any claims of encumbrance on the proprietor’s estates, the assemblymen pointed to the 
illogic of forcing the people to pay for the proprietor’s defense while he contributed 
nothing. Such a measure was “abhorrent to common Justice, common Reason, and 
common Sense.” The legislators further accused the proprietor and governor of 
attempting to subvert the rights of Englishmen. “Our Lord Proprietary, though a subject 
like ourselves, would send us out to fight for him while he keeps himself a Thousand 
Leagues remote from Danger! Vassals fight at their Lord’s expense, but our Lord would 
have us defend his Estate at our own Expence. This is not merely Vassalage . . .  it is even 
more slavish than Slavery itself.” This rhetoric rankled Morris so much that he effectively 
wrote off any possibility of compromise with the assembly. “My assembly meets to­
morrow,” he complained to Shirley,” but by what I can learn nothing is to be expected 
from them.” The unwillingness of either side to bargain shocked even Governor 
Dinwiddie. “I think the G’r sh’d have submitted in hav’g the Proprietor’s private Estate 
subjected to the Taxes o f the other Subjects.”143
Governor Sharpe of Maryland avoided Pennsylvania’s troubles by not bothering to 
call his assembly at all. Sharpe distrusted the Maryland assembly, which was “fond of 
following such Precedents” set by Pennsylvania. Instead, the governor took action on his
143 MPCP, 569-85, 322n; Dinwiddie to Governor Dobbs, [Williamsburg], 29 August 1755, Dinwiddie 
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own and ordered several small forts, garrisoned by volunteers, to be built throughout “the 
distant parts of the province” to shelter outlying settlers.144
O f the three colonies immediately concerned by Braddock’s defeat, Virginia 
responded with greatest heart. The ever-optimistic Dinwiddie initially discounted reports 
o f the slaughter and hoped it was “not so bad as reported.” Even after confirmation of the 
loss, Dinwiddie remained upbeat. Dunbar was a good officer, he wrote Washington, and 
he would surely counterattack and prevail. With Dunbar’s retreat to Philadelphia, the 
governor shifted his hopes to the Virginia troops, whom he considered sending to the 
Great Meadows of Fort Necessity fame to build a fort and prevent further French 
incursions.145
After his appointment as commander of the Virginia Regiment, Washington 
persuaded Dinwiddie to abandon plans for the Great Meadow (possibly out of personal 
aversion) and turn his efforts to more realistic ventures. Dinwiddie concurred and 
authorized Washington to raise sixteen companies to form the Virginia Regiment, 
disbanded after Washington’s defeat in 1754, and another six companies o f “rangers”146 to 
defend the frontier during the regiment’s generation. Like his Maryland counterpart, 
Dinwiddie ordered the construction of blockhouses throughout the backcountry to 
encourage settlers to remain and defend their homes.147
144 Sharpe to Dinwiddie, [Annapolis], 23 August 1755; Sharpe to William and John Sharpe, [Annapolis],
11 August 1755, Sharpe Correspondence, 270-71, 267.
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However, unlike Morris and Sharpe, Dinwiddie worked closely with his assembly 
and successfully passed a number of measures in August 1755 to counter the French and 
Indians. During the first session of the House of Burgesses following Braddock’s defeat, 
Dinwiddie followed New England precedent and presented a bill that provided a £10 
bounty for every Indian scalp brought to a government agent. “I hope you will think the 
Measures taken by our Brethren of New-England, expedient to your Safety also; and by 
giving a Reward for the taking or scalping of Indian Enemies, provide such as 
Encouragement as may induce our People to cut off the Destroyers, before they come to 
execute their purposed Villanies.” While this did little to endear the Virginians to friendly 
Indians, it gave the British colonists a personal stake in the war, even if it was purely 
economical. Along with the scalp bounty, the burgesses amended the militia law to 
authorize Washington’s recruiting for the Virginia regiment. In addition, to support the 
new regiment, the assembly voted another £40,000 to be raised by a duty on imported 
goods, a head tax on all tithable people, and a land tax.148
With solid support from his legislature and governor, Washington acted quickly in 
his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Virginia military to protect the Virginia frontier. 
Admonishing his district commanders for remaining within their forts and leaving the 
settlers to fend for themselves, he ordered them to “send out strong Parties to Scour the 
Woods and Mountains.” He also vigorously pushed his recruiting officers to fill the ranks 
o f his embryonic regiment.149
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Despite Washington’s best efforts, few volunteers signed up to fight. In a letter to 
Washington, William Brickenbrough reported the difficulties encountered by his recruiting 
officer. “He has Try’d Every place where there was the least liklyhood of getting recruits 
b u t . . . the People are deaf to reason . . . They are determin’d not to go till they are 
forced.” Unfortunately, coercion became necessary, but such methods produced 
undesirable results. Many Virginians violently resisted compulsory service and ended up in 
jail, only to have mobs free them hours later.150
Washington’s experience with local militia units was little better. These part-time 
soldiers frequently refused to assemble and leave their homes undefended. In October 
1755, Washington called on a militia company to follow him in pursuit o f a raiding party, 
“but was told by Colo. Martin who had attempted to raise the Militia for the same purpose 
that it was impossible to get above 20 or 25 Men, They having absolutely refus’d to stir, 
choosing as they say to die with their Wives and Family’s.”151
Although troubled daily by recalcitrant recruits and bullheaded militiamen, 
Washington and Dinwiddie both recognized the need to enact changes in how they fought 
the French and Indians. Having witnessed the futility o f massed volleys against a scattered 
enemy, Washington ordered his commanders to train their men to fire at individual marks. 
Dinwiddie, borrowing a page from Benjamin Church and King Philip’s War, recommended 
using dogs to aid in tracking raiding parties. “I think some good Dogs w ’d soon find out 
the skulking Places of the Ind’s, so that the Rangers may come up with them.” Adam 
Stephen requested “Shoe-packs or Moccosons” to outfit his Scouts to prevent “the Indians
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discovering] our Parties by the Tract of their Shoes.” Finally, Dinwiddie and Washington 
both saw the need to train soldiers in the methods of woodland warfare. The governor 
urged Washington to “teach [the soldiers] as much as possible Bush-fighting.” In 
response, Washington called on his old acquaintance, Christopher Gist, to form a company 
of rangers consisting entirely o f woodsmen. Clearly Virginia was adapting to the Indian 
threat.152
While actively preparing to fight external enemies, Dinwiddie and other colonial 
leaders also sought to counter the enemy within. As in all times of extreme emergency, 
citizens and government officials saw dissidents and undesirable elements of society as 
potential threats or potential scapegoats. Governor Dinwiddie was particularly concerned 
about the vast number o f African slaves in Virginia. They required constant supervision, 
especially after Braddock’s defeat. The slaves had been “very audacious in the Defeat on 
the Ohio,” believing that the French would grant them freedom and land. As a result, 
Dinwiddie had to leave soldiers in each county to “prevent these Creatures enter’g into 
Combination]s and wicked Design ag’st the Subjects.” Governor Shirley feared this 
would prevent the southern colonies from contributing much to the war effort. As it was, 
troops desperately needed on the frontiers served on slave patrols instead.153
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Catholics attracted a great deal of suspicion as well. Because Catholics were 
“spiritual kindred” to the French, most colonists automatically suspected them of treason. 
The justices o f Berks County, Pennsylvania considered Romanists to be “the worst 
Subjects and worst of Neighbors.” Similar to the reaction of the slaves, many Catholics 
allegedly expressed “great Joy at the bad News lately come from the Army.” While certain 
elements of the Catholic community may have enjoyed tweaking John Bull’s nose, they 
gained nothing from the defeat. Indian tomahawks split a Catholic Englishman’s head no 
less than that o f a Protestant. Still, Protestants entertained notions o f Catholics sneaking 
away to Fort Duquesne to conspire with the French for the takeover of the colonies, and 
the Berks County justices demanded quick action to counter such imagined threats. 
Maryland suffered from similar suspicions. “The clamors against Popery is as loud as 
ever,” wrote Daniel Dulany, who witnessed the near lynching of a priest in Alexandria, 
Virginia. The priest escaped execution only by bribing a boatman to row him across the 
Potomac River to safety. “Something ought to be done in regard to these priests, but the 
present heat and ferment of the times are such that nothing short of a total extermination of 
them . . . will be heard of.” Governor Sharpe ordered his local justices to inquire into “the 
Reports of the tumultuous Meetings and Cabaling of Negroes, the Misbehaviour o f the 
Roman Catholicks . . . and the absence o f . . . Priests,” but his deputies found nothing of 
substance. In Philadelphia, anti-Catholic rhetoric turned into violent action. “The Mob 
here upon this occasion were very unruly, assembling in great numbers, with an intention of 
demolishing the Mass House belonging to the Roman Catholics, wherein they were 
underhand excited and encouraged by some People of Higher Rank. But the peaceable 
Quakers . . . prevailed with the Mob to desist.” Governor Shirley looked beyond slaves
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and Catholics and imagined a universal insurrection of all “undesirables.” “It is well 
known, how much these Colonies abound with Roman Catholicks, Jacobites, Indented 
Servants for long terms, and transported Convicts, who, far from being depended upon 
against the enemy, would doubtless, many of them instigate the Slaves to rebel, and 
perhaps join with them.”154
This anti-Catholic, anti-Indian, anti-rabble rhetoric surfaced in religious sermons as 
well. Religion gained heightened attention in the months after Braddock’s defeat as people 
sought divine answers for the loss and guidance for the future that politicians and soldiers 
could not provide. Parsons capitalized on the opportunity and turned their oratorical skills 
and biblical themes to meet the twin goals of spiritual conversion and public service in war. 
While preachers may have used the terror of Indian attack to reap a rich harvest of souls, 
they provided invaluable service as promoters of military service and communal 
preparedness. Behind their fiery and often hysterical rhetoric, preachers shared certain 
characteristics in their messages and methods. All sought to determine the cause of the 
debacle on the Monongahela, which was invariably sin, and present the means to overcome 
colony-wide guilt. Many strove to establish the justness and necessity o f the war with 
secular treatises and scriptural prophecy. Finally, as guardians o f their people, preachers 
inspired their audiences to greater levels of piety and martial preparedness to ensure 
ultimate victory.155
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27.
155Barbara A. Larson, Prologue to Revolution: The War Sermons o f the Reverend Samuel Davies: A 
Rhetorical Study (Milwaukee: The Speech Communication Association, 1978), 244; Harry S. Stout, The
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Thomas Barton had no single audience to administer to. As a traveling missionary 
for the Church of England, Barton preached to small and large crowds throughout York 
and Cumberland counties in Pennsylvania. A short time after Braddock’s defeat, Barton 
delivered an address entitled Unanimity and Public Spirit to an audience at Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania. He used the opportunity to chastise the people—a thinly-veiled reference to 
the assembly and the governor—for division, disunity, and selfishness. “We have been rent 
and tom into so many Factions and Parties,” he cried, that the colonists faced the 
destruction of their faith and way of life. Popish fiends hovered in the shadows, waiting to 
strike down the “pure reformed Light o f the blessed Gospel” and replace it with “Legends 
and Traditions . . .  in an unknown Tongue.” He summoned memories o f the “bloody 
Persecutions of an unrelenting Mary” and the repression under the “bigotted James” to 
remind his people what their fate would be under a Catholic sovereign. Braddock’s defeat 
was a warning from God, Barton continued, and an opportunity for redemption. “Our 
heavenly Father has thought fit to permit” the French and Indians to prevail so “that we 
may thereby be led to Repentence before it be too late.” The fiery preacher concluded that 
salvation and victory lay in the reunification of Pennsylvania (specifically the government) 
and concerted action. “Let us therefore lay aside every idle Division and Distinction, and 
be heartily united for the future.”156
William Vinal’s message to Rhode Islanders was considerably harsher than 
Burton’s to the Pennsylvanians. As with many war sermons, Vinal reverted to the Old
New England Soul: Preaching and Religious Culture in Colonial New England (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 244.
156 James S. M. Anderson, The History o f the Church o f England in the Colonies and Foreign 
Dependencies o f the British Empire, 2nd ed. (London: Rivingtons, 1856), 266-67; Thomas Barton, 
Unanimity and Public Spirit (Philadelphia: B. Franklin and D. Haly, 1755), 9-13.
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Testament, compared the colonists to the ancient Hebrews, and invoked the powerful 
image of the angry and vengeful God of Abraham. But instead of criticizing the people for 
secular disunity, Vinal accused them of separating themselves from God through unending 
sin, which he labeled “the Accursed Thing.” Success in war depended on God’s assistance, 
he claimed, and a society must put its sins aside to gain God’s favor. God “cannot go forth 
with our Army to fight our Battles for us . . . [if] the Accursed Thing [is] in the Midst of 
us.” But sin was rampant in the colonies, Vinal vehemently claimed, especially among 
“Persons of Note, and by Men in Authority and Office, both Civil and Ecclesiastical.” He 
attempted to identify the colonists’ foremost sin but found “so many Accursed Things 
among us, that I have been almost at a Loss which to single out.” Finally, after haranguing 
profaners, heretics, drunks, and women in “immodest clothing,” Vinal declared “self- 
confidence in War” to be the vilest sin of all.157
Such confidence by itself was not the cause of Braddock’s destruction, but when 
“added to all our other Flagrant Crimes, and public Sins, [it] seems to have f i l l ’s up our 
Measure, and ripen'd us for the Melancholy Event.” Vinal reminded his audience of the 
universal hubris upon Braddock’s arrival in Virginia and his march to Fort Duquesne. 
Success seemed guaranteed, and soldiers boasted of their prowess, “proudly declaring, that 
they will have the Victory whether He will give it or not; And so by Consequence, setting 
up themselves, not only against God, but above God.” But the sin o f confidence was not 
Braddock’s alone, Vinal continued, but of every citizen. “0  Braddock, thou wast slain in 
our low Places.” Vinal railed at his audience, bitterly recounting New England’s fall from 
grace. ‘"New-England. . . Thou wast once an Asylum of persecuted Saints; but thou art
157 William Vinal, A Sermon on the Accursed Thing that Hinders Success and Victory in War, Occasioned
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now a Den o f Thieves and Robbers.” But to Vinal, even his audience of “criminals” had 
hope for salvation if they acted without pause. “TO ARMS, ye Descendents o f ancient 
Heroes,” he cried to them. Vinal equally demanded that the colonial governments do their 
allotted part and provide men and money to prosecute the war. And like Barton, he called 
for “ Unanimity and a good Understanding among the English Governments in 
America.”158
More influential than either Barton or Vinal, and possibly the most influential 
preacher during the war, was Samuel Davies of Hanover County, Virginia. A dissenting 
preacher, who had led the Presbyterians of Virginia in their struggle for toleration, Davies 
worked tirelessly throughout the Seven Years’ War to recruit soldiers and ready the 
province for war. He possessed unlimited spirit and zeal, and his inflammatory style of 
oratory captivated his audiences. Davies seemed “fired by equal parts backwater 
circumstances and audience, New Light enthusiasm, and English Whig animadversions 
against the French.” Following Braddock’s defeat, he wholeheartedly committed himself 
to the war effort, and through a series of war sermons he became one of the most 
successful recruiters in the colony. In his sermons, Davies connected secular and divine 
goals; to be ready to face the French and Indians, he said, Virginia must be both spiritually 
and materially prepared. To Davies, political survival of the colony was a direct correlative 
of the personal salvation of its citizens. Therefore, secular service, usually in the form of 
military service, became an “adjunct” of religious duty and an expression of religious faith. 
Thus, as a soldier of Christ, Davies contributed as much to the war effort as anyone who
by the Defeat o f the Hon. Edward Braddock. .  . (Newport, RI: James Franklin, 1755), 1, 6, 10-12.
158 Ibid., 12, 14-15, 18,21.
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carried a musket. The men he “saved” would, he believed, express their newly-found (or 
rediscovered) piety in public service.159
On August 5, 1755, Davies delivered Virginia's Danger and Remedy, which 
Davies saw as “a hurried Attempt to save a sinking Land.” During these “two marathon 
discourses” spanning the better part o f a day, he lamented the poor spiritual and physical 
condition of Virginia. A severe drought was causing crops to wither and die; trade was 
stagnant; money was in short supply; and taxes were heavy. All of these were signs of 
God’s displeasure and warnings for the people to repent and reform, said Davies. But 
Virginians, enraptured by secular vices, continued to ignore God’s admonitions, forcing 
Him to resort to the ultimate form of coercion. Braddock’s defeat and the vicious Indian 
raids, claimed Davies, were God’s final warning.160
Like Vinal, Davies rattled off a lengthy list of sins committed by Virginians and 
likewise focused on “People of high Life and affluent Fortunes.” However, these daily sins 
paled in comparison to Davies’s greatest accusation. He declared the masses to be atheists 
despite what they might profess, and he accused them of rejecting God as sovereign. Like 
Vinal’s charges of self-confidence, the Virginians’ rejection of God as the ultimate power 
had brought His wrath upon the people of America. Davies took individual sin and applied 
it to Virginia as a whole. The sins of the multitude, he believed, transferred to the body 
politic, rendering the colony fit only for destruction. Salvation of the state hinged on
159 George William Pilcher, ed., The Reverend Samuel Davies Abroad: The Diary o f a Journey to England 
and Scotland, 1753-55 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1967), x; Anderson, History o f the Church of 
England, 133; Marie L. Ahearn, The Rhetoric o f War: Training Day, the Militia, and the Military Sermon 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 102-06; Larson, Prologue to Revolution, 1-2.
160 Ahearn, Rhetoric o f War, 102; Samuel Davies, Virginia’s Danger and Remedy: Two Discourses, 
Occasioned by the Severe Drought in Sundry Parts o f the Country; and the Defeat o f General Braddock 
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repentance of the individual, and until that occurred, God would continue to “give thee up 
to thine Enemies, that though mayst feel and lament his Absence.” Like the Babylonians 
sent by God to chastise the ancient Hebrews, the French and Indians would continue to 
attack and triumph until God was satisfied.161
With great emotion, Davies called for his flock to act before God destroyed them 
out of anger. “REPENT! O my Countrymen, REPENT! REPENT! Down upon your 
Knees before your injured Sovereign . . . Confess your Guilt, and implore Forgiveness.”
But while calling for spiritual conversion, Davies did not ignore the practical aspects of 
war. Dismissing the militia as “a mere Farce,” Davies called on the people and leaders of 
Virginia to gather arms and ammunition, reinforce defenses, and join the army. “Put 
yourselves in a Posture o f D e fe n s e Although he demanded surrender to God, Davies 
seemed to be preaching “God helps those who help themselves.”162
Davies’s war sermons had a powerful influence both on his audiences and those 
who never heard him preach. Governor Dinwiddie caught the spirit o f repentance, or at 
least he recognized the need for public action in this regard. In late September, possibly 
moved by Davies, the governor called for a day of fasting and repentance. “National 
Repentance is the only Remedy for national Guilt.” Davies’s influence on audiences was 
even more striking. John Rice recorded the impressions of several “aged friends” who had 
heard Davies speak. The emotional response of the audience highlights Davies’s profound 
ability to excite people into action. “As the preacher poured forth the stream of his 
eloquence, his own spirit was transfused into his hearers: the cheek that was blanched with
161 Ibid., 26-27.
162 Davies, Virginia’s Danger, 29, 11, 44.
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fear reddened, and the drooping eye kindled with martial fire, and at the conclusion, every 
voice was ready to say~‘Let us march against the enemy—let us conquer or die!’”163
Who were the enemies that Davies’s audience rushed to combat? In reality, the 
foes were French troops, Canadian militiamen, and a wide range of Indian tribes. But there 
was a clear if uncoordinated effort on the part of clerics, government officials, and private 
citizens to portray the enemy in anything but human terms. While preachers tended to 
produce the most virulent rhetoric, they held no monopoly on hatred. Just as New 
Englanders had feared losing their “civilized” status and becoming “savage” in King 
Philip’s War, the colonists of the 1750s were determined to remove any shred of humanity 
from their enemy. Common references for French or Indians in sermons, legislation, and 
letters included “Barbarians,” “Merciless Savages,” or the occasional “lawless Sons of 
Violence and Plunder.” Governor Sharpe even described the invasion of the raiders as an 
“infestation,” as if their enemies were a swarm of vermin.164
A popular method among preachers for dehumanizing the enemy was to portray the 
French and Indians as “agents of hell, as demons of Satan on the side of malignant, evil 
powers.” Davies accused Indians of “swilling” in their victims’ blood, thus investing the 
Indians with satanic, vampire-like powers. “They are not Men\ they are not Beasts-of- 
Prey, they are something worse; they must be infernal Furies in human Shape.”165
163 Virginia Gazette, 19 September 1755; William Henry Foote, Sketches of Virginia: Historical and 
Biographical, 1st Series (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966), 295.
164 Lepore, The Name o f War, Davies, Religion and Patriotism: The Constituents o f a Good Soldier 
(Philadelphia: James Chattin, 1755), 3-4; Barton, Unanimity and Public Spirit, 4; Sharpe to Shirley, 
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165 Larson, Prologue to Revolution, 34-35; Davies, Religion and Patriotism, 5; Davies, Virginia's Danger, 
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By equating the French and Indians with Satan and stripping them of their 
humanity, Davies and others turned the war into a struggle between good and evil, a holy 
war against the lawless sons of perdition. Such infernal enemies, with an unquenchable 
thirst for blood and violence, deserved only horrible violence in return. Governor 
Dinwiddie used such reasoning to justify his request for the scalp bounty. The “brutal 
Savages” who perpetrated “the most cruel Outrages” surrendered any right for mercy and 
had thereby “subjected themselves to be considered, rather as devouring Beasts of Prey, 
then hostile Men.” A holy war against the forces of darkness appealed to some colonists 
and preyed on the fears of others, encouraging and provoking many to either enlist and 
fight or actively maintain the struggle at home.166
The rhetoric of war did not disparage the French and Indians alone. Braddock’s 
defeat and William Johnson’s “victory” at Lake George with an army of provincials led to 
widespread questioning of British invincibility and superiority as well as a growing sense 
among the colonists o f being American161 Years later, Benjamin Franklin noted this early 
crack in imperial relations. “This whole Transaction gave us Americans the first suspicion 
that our exalted ideas of the prowess of British regular troops had not been well founded.” 
Johnson’s triumph, with only colonial troops and Indians, over French regulars under the 
illustrious Baron Dieskau seemed to confirm suspicions. Charles Chauncy proposed that 
“the best British regulars could not have dispensed matters . . . with greater wisdom.” In
166 Mcllwain, Journals o f the House of Burgesses, 298.
167 On September 8, 1755, a British force of provincial troops and Indians led by Sir William Johnson 
defeated a French and Indian force led by Baron de Dieskau, a famous veteran of numerous European 
wars, on the shores of Lake George, New York. After repulsing several attacks by French regulars, the 
colonial and Indian forces swept the French from the field and captured Dieskau. Although Johnson was 
heavily criticized for abandoning his drive on Crown Point, his victoiy, in light of Braddock’s crushing 
defeat, earned him a baronetcy and a pension.
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fact, he thought regulars of little use except to “defend a fort, or to support Indian forces 
against regular troops.” British officers and soldiers, he continued, were so haughty and 
proud that they would rather stand in the open and die than “practise such a low kind of 
military art” as that of the Indians.168
Chauncy, like many Americans, was convinced that American troops and officers 
were necessary to guarantee success for any British military ventures in North America.
“It is now made manifest. . . that neither British officer, nor private soldiers, without 
American assistance, can be depended on for success against American enemies.” He 
attributed the loss on the Monongahela to the British officers, who “had no Idea of the 
Manner o f fighting in use here.” Future commanders-in-chief would undoubtedly, and out 
of necessity, act “with the advise of some thoroughly experienced Americans actually 
present with him.”169
Chauncy obviously wrote with Johnson and Washington in mind as the 
“experienced Americans.” After Fort Necessity and Braddock’s expedition, Washington’s 
reputation for wilderness expertise spread with astonishing speed. Although both battles 
led to defeat, reports of Washington’s and the Virginians’ aptitude for irregular warfare 
created an image o f wildemess-sawy fighters compared to “the stiff and stupid redcoat.”
In fact, Seth Pomeroy of the Massachusetts provincials declared Washington to be the true 
hero o f the Monongahela. “The salvation of [Braddock’s] whole army from destruction 
was made, under God, by a young American officer named George Washington.” This 
image was not entirely realistic. Historian Armstrong Starkey discounts the validity o f
168 Franklin, Autobiography, 225; [Chauncy], Letter to a Friend, 3; J. Mitchell, The Contest in America 
between Great Britain and France (London: 1757), 137-38.
169 [Chauncy], Letter to a Friend, 7-8.
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such proclamations by examining Washington’s tactics in 1754 and later during the war 
with Britain. “This was the same Washington who had been surrounded and trapped at 
Great Meadows the preceding year and who, during the American War of Independence, 
rejected calls for guerilla war and created an army of which Bland would have been 
proud.” While Washington’s initial attack on French forces in 1754 was an ambush, his 
reaction was entirely conventional: retreat to a fort and offer battle in an open field.170
Not all of Washington’s contemporaries shared the belief in American superiority or 
contempt for the redcoats either. One American lamented the lack of wildemess-sawy 
frontiersmen in the colonies, declaring his fellow subjects “nothing but a set of farmers and 
planters, used only to the axe or hoe,” not bom with Pennsylvania rifles in hand or hatchets 
at their hips. Daniel Dulany hoped that Braddock’s defeat would not “induce the ministry 
into the mistake that regulars are of no great use in our woods.” In fact, nothing could be 
“more detrimental to America” than to remove the regulars.171
Regardless o f the truth or fiction of British inferiority and American preeminence, 
what was truly important was the American people’s perception of Braddock’s loss, and 
large numbers of Americans believed the rhetoric that bombarded them. A letter in the 
Boston Public Advertiser, openly challenging the notion of the superiority of British 
regulars, represented widespread feelings. “[Braddock’s defeat] is, and always will be the 
Consequence of Old England Officers and Soldiers being sent to America; they have 
neither Skill nor Courage for this Method of Fighting, for the Indians will kill them as fast
170 Leach, Arms for Empire, 407n; Seth Pomeroy, The Journals and Papers of Seth Pomeroy: Sometime 
General in the Colonial Service, ed. Louis Effingham DeForest (New York: Society of Colonial Wars, 
1926), 133; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 96; General Humphrey Bland was the 
author of A Treatise on Military Discipline, which became the semi-official drill book for the British army.
171 Mitchell, Contest in America, 72; Dulaney, “Military and Political Affairs,” 31.
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as pigeons.” Furthermore, the author expressed the growing belief in the superiority of 
American soldiers. “300 New England Men would have routed this Party o f Indians.” 
Finally, it advocated quasi-independence. “We want nothing but Money and Liberty to act 
. . and we’ll soon have all North America.” The legends surrounding George 
Washington’s conduct in battle further enhanced this stance, contributed to 1775’s rage 
militaire, and lent credence to the legend of “the omnipresent American marksman clothed 
not in a military uniform but in a hunting shirt.” 172
Finally, the defeat and subsequent deluge of criticism and accusations even 
managed to put a chink in the armor of the British military establishment. Although the 
British military had long been exposed to or participated in irregular warfare in Ireland and 
on the European continent or read accounts o f it in the American colonies, they suddenly 
realized that they faced a new kind ofpetite guerre, different from the partisan warfare of 
Europe. Military leaders, heeding Braddock’s sage remarks, “Another time we shall know 
better how to deal with them,” recognized the need for units and soldiers that could learn 
to compete successfully with the French and Indians and defeat them through superior 
proficiency in their own methods. The Virginian Adam Stephen neatly captured this need 
for change. “It ought to be laid down as a Maxim to attack them [Indians] first, to fight 
them in their own way, and go against them light and naked, as they come against us . . . 
You might as well send a Cow in pursuit o f a Hare as an English Soldier . . . after 
Canadeans . . . or Naked Indians.” Still rightly enamored of the capabilities of continental 
tactics, key British army officers sought to combine the qualities of scouts with the 
discipline of the line, resulting in the British light infantry. This adaptation to conditions, or
172 Davis, “Newspaper Accounts,” 319-320; Breslaw, “A Dismal Tragedy,” 27.
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“Americanization” of the British army, provided the flexibility necessary to compete in 
American warfare. The crucial campaigns still to come in the war, centered on the capture 
o f large fortifications in the midst o f inhospitable terrain, would justify their decision.173
173 Leach, Arms for Empire, 369; Kopperman, Braddock, 226-27.
CONCLUSION
Edward Braddock’s defeat in 1755 is relegated to marginalia in many history books 
today. Compared to the slaughter of General Abercrombie’s redcoats at Fort Ticonderoga 
in 1758 or James Wolfe’s victory on the Plains of Abraham a year later, the fight on the 
banks of the Monongahela was small-scale. Indeed the consequences of defeat, while 
immediately devastating to the soldiers who fought in it and the settlers who felt the wrath 
of Indian raiders, merely postponed British victory for a few years.
Beyond the short-term strategic implications, the battle forced the British to 
reanalyze their methods of fighting. Although the British had been long-exposed to 
irregular warfare in Europe and by proxy in North America, this initial encounter of 
regulars with Indians forced the British to rethink war in America, just as their experiences 
in Scotland, Ireland, and on the European continent had done in the centuries before. Like 
any culture faced with something new or novel, they were forced to analyze their own 
methods, evaluate new techniques, and integrate them into their own culture. British 
leaders, such as Henry Bouquet, Robert Rogers, and Lord Loudoun would make 
adjustments just as Lord Mountjoy had done in Ireland two hundred years before. This did 
not invalidate their methods of warfare as some historians propose. Instead, the shift 
indicated a degree of flexibility developed through centuries of trial and error. The changes 
after the Braddock debacle represented only one more such adjustment.
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The lessons learned from Braddock’s defeat were not lost during the American 
Revolutionary War either, where both the British and the American rebels used 
backcountry raiders and tactics. John Butler’s dreaded Tory rangers waged a brutal war in 
the New England and mid-Atlantic borderlands, as did rebel George Rogers Clark in the 
Illinois country. In a campaign eerily reminiscent of Braddock’s march on Fort Duquesne, 
General John Stark led a conventional force of Continentals on a devastating march 
through Iroquoia and returned virtually untouched. In the larger history of warfare in 
America, Braddock’s defeat may have been insignificant, but the ripples it produced 
created change far beyond its scale.
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Figure 1. A highly idealized sketch of a European set-piece battle (Battle of Culloden, 
April 15, 1745) From James Johnstone, A Memoir o f  the ‘Forty-Five, ed. Brian Rawson
(London: Folio Society, 1958), 124, facing.
Figure 2. Champlain’s Fight with the Mohawks. From Colin G. Calloway, The Western 
Abenakis o f  Vermont 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival o f  an Indian People
(Norman: Univ. of OklahomaPress, 1990), 60.
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Figure 3. Irish Kerne, ca. 1540-1550. From David Beers Quinn, The 
Elizabethans and the Irish (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966), Plate 3.
Figure 4. Successful return of an English force after the defeat of the 
Irish kerne, from Derricke’s Image o f Ireland, 1581. Note the severed 
heads and prisoners on halters or being beaten. Thomas Bartlett and 
Keith Jeffery, ed. A Military History o f  Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1996), 119.
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FIGURE 5. French, Indian and English Borderlands 1756-64
From Lewis Butler, The Royal Americans. vol. 1 of The Annals o f  the K ing’s Royal Rifle Corps 
(London: Smith. Elder, and Co., 1913), 194 facing page.
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Figure 6. Operations Against Fort Duquesne, 1755, 1758
From Douglas Edward Leach, Arms fo r  Empire: A Military History o f  the British Colonies in North 
America, 1607-1763 (New York:Collier-Macmillan, 1973), 363.
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FIGURE 7. Captain Robert Orme’s Sketch of March Plan for General Braddock’s Column
From Winthrop Sargent, The History o f  an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, in 1755, Pennsylvania 
Historical Society, Memoirs, 5 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1856), 336.
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FIGURE 6. Disposition of Braddock’s Army, 1:00 PM 9 July 1755
From Winthrop Sargent, The History o f  an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, in 1755, Pennsylvania 
Historical Society, Memoirs, 5 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1856), 218.
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